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We proposed a new protocol known as METEOR (MisbEhavior deTEctor and en-
fORcer) that works on top of any Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) reactive hop-based
routing protocol such as Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance-Vector (AODV) in order to miti-
gate/prevent node misbehavior that will threaten the integrity of the entire network. In
open communities, there is a need for such mechanisms to ensure correct network op-
erations since under those environments, there exists heterogeneous users with different
goals sharing the resources of their devices such as battery power, CPU and I/O cycles,
etc in order to ensure global network connectivity. As a result, misbehavior can arise
due to selfishness or greediness.
All previous works for such add-on schemes operated by assuming the underlying
routing protocols are some kind of source-based routing protocol such as Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR). Although they claimed that their schemes are able to work on top of any
routing protocol, there has been no formal verification of any kind. As a result, there
are no current proven schemes designed specially for hop-based routing protocol. It is
also well a known fact that source-based routing protocol posed scalability problem as
compared to hop-based routing protocol. As a result, the applicability and performance
of previous schemes will thus be limited as well.
Rather than allowing any misbehaving node to drop the data packets as in other
previous schemes, METEOR incorporates an alternative route finding mechanism to aid
in the re-diverting of current traffic stream around the suspected misbehaving node on
the fly to reach the intended destination. In addition, we also made enhancements to the
normal watchdog monitoring mechanism to lower the false classification rate. A second
chance redemption mechanism was also proposed to allow misbehaving nodes back into
the network after a randomly computed exclusion period has lapsed rather than totally
isolating them from the network upon just a single detection. Finally, we suggest a
method to dynamically adjust the classification threshold and the exclusion time of
misbehaving node by taking into account the current neighbors size of the excluder node
and the number of previously noted misbehaving attempts by the misbehaving node.
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The field of mobile ad hoc wireless networking has attracted enormous amounts of
global research interest in recent years, primarily because of their inherent ability to
self-organize, allows for rapid deployment and no requirement of preexisting infrastruc-
ture which offers an attractive solution for potential applications in many exciting new
areas. However, many unresolved issues remain and one which has taken caught the
attend of researchers in recent times concerns the behavior of individual nodes operating
under Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs).
As nodes in mobile ad hoc network may spread over a large geographical range than
the communication signal can reach, they may have to communicate over multi-hops.
As a result, the dependability of the routing operations in MANETs inherently relies
on node behavior. Presently, the conceptualization of routing algorithms to support
multi-hop operations assumes all nodes to be well-behaved. However, in reality there
may exist constrained, selfish or even malicious nodes. Under such situations, the nodes
do not have a common goal and it would be advantageous not to cooperate. As node
cooperation forms the underlying core basis for the proper functioning of MANETs, this
would then force the breakdown of the entire network if there is a high proportion of
nodes that deviate from the expected behavior.
Indeed, literatures investigating the impact such nodes would have on MANETs
[1, 2, 3] showed that up to a certain level, the entire network is equivalent to one that
is not functioning at all. Depending on the proportion of misbehaving nodes and their
specific strategies, network throughput can be severely degraded, packet loss increased,
1
2normal nodes denied service, and the formation of network partitions. The tremendous
growth in the use of mobile devices and the emergence of applications for MANETs in
recent years have spurred the global MANETs research communities to find a solution to
this teething problem. There have been efforts [4, 5, 6] looking into how to get network
nodes to cooperate.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
As routing is one of the most crucial working aspect of MANETs, huge amount of efforts
have been devoted to them. One of the key implicit assumptions made in the design
of routing protocols is that all the nodes are cooperative and well-behaved. In the
context of applications such as military or search-and-rescue operations, where all the
nodes belong to the same authority and hence their users share the same goal, these
assumptions hold true. However, MANETs have also been making significant in-roads
in the support for open communities in recent periods due to the potential revolution
MANETs promised to bestow upon modern computing. In such an environment, diverse
users with different goals and objectives, share their device resources to ensure global
networking connectivity. This sort of communities already have their equivalent in the
traditional wired networks namely in the form of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [7, 8, 9, 10].
However, there are significant differences between the fixed and mobile environment.
Resources such as battery power and bandwidth are severely constraint in mobile systems
as compared to wired. From another perspective, open MANETs closely resembles
human social environments: a group of persons can mutually benefit from cooperation
so long every participant contributes with approximately the same share. Unfortunately,
in general, cooperative behavior implies increased resource consumption, high device
utilization and, thus is not in the best interest of the autonomous nodes in the MANETs.
Consider the following scenario (Figure 1.1): students equipped with mobile de-
vices are motivated to cooperate when moving within a campus wide wireless network
with incomplete coverage. Only when nodes forward requests and messages from other
nodes, then connectivity for the entire MANETs is ensured. If there are no mechanisms
to reward cooperation and discourage misbehavior, some users may start to stray, e.g.
3instructing their devices not to relay messages since they can effectively increase their
battery life span and bandwidth. Such behavior may snow-balled to devastating effect:
cooperative nodes that faithfully forward messages for third parties will turn selfish when
they discover selfish nodes are rewarded for doing nothing and yet themselves received no
tangible benefits. This will continue to the point where the entire MANETs eventually
collapses.
Figure 1.1: An Example of the Snow-Ball Effect of Node Misbehavior in a Campus
Setting.
Such behavior may be exacerbated by the operations of MANETs routing protocols:
some protocols use caches to accelerate route discoveries. As a result, those caches
are more likely to contain routes containing cooperative nodes, omitting misbehaving
nodes. Thus cooperative users are likely to have their battery drained at a faster pace
while other intermediate nodes do not spend their energy forwarding messages. This
type of behavior is very likely to happen on open MANETs if they are ever deployed.
While it is impossible to totally prevent misbehavior, it is entirely possible to design and
implement algorithms that discourage them. This can be achieved by applying some
kind of penalty/reward to users.
Thus, the problem pose: How can we ensure that an existing system provides ac-
4ceptable performance despite the presence of misbehavior? As a specific application to
the case of a MANETs, how can we keep the network in a functional state for regular
nodes when other nodes do not route and forward correctly?
All previous works for such add-on schemes operate using source-based routing proto-
cols such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). Although it is claimed that the schemes are
applicable to any kind of MANETs routing protocols, they remained unproven. It is also
well known that source-based routing protocol posed scalability problem as compared
to hop-based routing protocol. As a result, we question the flexibility of those schemes.
Specifically, there are no current proven schemes designed specially for hop-based routing
protocol such as AODV. The only non add-on scheme designed for hop-based routing
protocols that we are aware of is the Security-aware Ad-hoc Routing (SAR) [11] where
AODV is modified to include security metrics for path computation and selection. How-
ever, it applies more in the area of secure routing using cryptography which is different
from what we are attempting to solve here. In addition, we noticed that those systems
do not allow nodes redemption which is unfair in case they change their behavior later
on. Lastly, previous schemes also do not attempt to salvage dropped data packets if it is
observed that forwarding does not take place as expected at the next node. Throughput
can possibly be increased if there is some effort to re-transmit them to the destination
node. Motivated by all these reasons, we thus proposed our protocol to address these
shortcomings.
1.2 An Overview of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
MANETs represent a new class of communication networks that have emerged in re-
cent years. Rooted at the research of military network in the U.S., ad hoc networks
have become increasingly important in commercial applications. Composed of either
stationary or free roaming wireless mobile nodes that may vary in capabilities and uses,
MANETs allow the dynamic formation of arbitrary and temporary network topologies
which enable people and devices to seamlessly internetwork from anywhere at any time,
abolishing the reliance for fixed, well-defined communication infrastructures.
Nodes are computing and communication devices which can be laptop computers,
5Personal Digital Assistances (PDAs), cellular phones or even sensors (refer to Figure
1.2). They may operate autonomously or connect to the Internet. MANETs are ex-
pected to play a colossal role especially in scenarios, where an instant need for networks
is required but access to fixed communication infrastructure is either nonexistent or im-
possible. Potential applications that have been identified, but not limited to, include
the following: diaster recovery situations, defense applications (army, navy, air force),
healthcare, academic institutions and corporate conventions/meetings. We will discuss
below in greater details on the key characteristics of ad hoc networks, their potential
usages in our daily lives and the research challenges faced.
Figure 1.2: An Example of a Heterogeneous MANET Environment.
1.2.1 Key Characteristics of Ad Hoc Networks
Due to the totally different paradigm in which they expected to function in, ad hoc
networks have vastly different characteristics from the conventional wired networks we
are familiar with. Their key characteristics are as outlined below.
• Infrastructure-less or with minimum infrastructure support : Ad hoc networks do
not have, or simply do not rely on infrastructure support for various networking
tasks such as routing, management, and etc.
• Self-organizing and self-managing : Due to the absence of network infrastructure,
6nodes must possess the ability to organize and maintain the network by themselves.
• Mobile and wireless: Most or all of the nodes are mobile causing dynamic topology
changes. In addition, since most nodes are mobile, this means communication must
be through wireless means.
• Frequent topology changes: The network topology changes when new mobile nodes
join in, some nodes leave, or some routes break down. Frequent, temporary, and
unannounced loss of network connectivity is very common.
• Node is both a host and a router : A node may want to connect to another node
that is beyond the single-hop range, thus inherent routing support is necessary for
each node since there is no network infrastructure support.
• Multi-hop: Multi-hopping is possible since each node can route traffic for other
nodes. This feature is a highly desirable capability in ad hoc network simply
because single-hop ad hoc network does not scale large, thus limiting the commu-
nication among the nodes.
• Power constraint : Since nodes can be mobile, they cannot be line-powered but
instead they must carry their own exhaustible energy sources such as batteries.
• Network scale: As the network is composed of self-organized and self-managed
nodes, the scale of a network varies largely on a case by case basis.
• Heterogeneity : Each node may differ in capabilities since nodes can be devices of
different nature. Also, in order to allow connection to infrastructure-based network
(to form a hybrid network), some nodes can communicate with more than one type
of network.
1.2.2 Potential Usage Scenarios
Ad hoc network can appear either as a pure network consisting only of user/client nodes
or as a hybrid one consisting of both client and infrastructure nodes. The latter form is
expected to be more common since it is likely that ad hoc network functions in a comple-
mentary role alongside them. Three cases where the complementary can occur are: when
7infrastructure is not available, infrastructure is available but incapable and lastly, when
infrastructure is not necessary. The existent of the first case is due mainly to economic
reasons whereas the second case is the result of inadequacies in the network infrastruc-
ture itself. The third case arises when only local traffic is present, un-necessitating the
need to do routing through the network infrastructure external to that location.
On the other hand, ad hoc network can serve as an alternative to infrastructure-
based network, forming a cellular-like communication network. They can either be used
to extend the range of existing WLAN networks over multiple-hops or to serve as an
intermediate solution before performing any costly upgrade on existing infrastructure.
The following are examples of the different forms ad hoc networks can take on:
1. Community Networks: They are formed in college campuses, city blocks, neigh-
borhoods, conferences and etc. mainly to provide wireless Internet access and re-
source sharing such as offering location-specific services. Another foreseeable and
profitable application is multi-player gaming.
2. Home Networks: Rather than restricting network access at a single spot, ad
hoc networking allows them to be available at virtually anywhere at home. In the
foreseeable future, wireless networks can be formed between various devices within
the house, allowing seamless cooperation, thus enhancing our quality of life.
3. Enterprise Networks: In order to facilitate the mobility of workers, ad hoc
networks are built within corporations as low cost and easy-to-install solutions.
This will allow for easy future expansion and reconfiguration of network topology
caused by e.g. growth of staff or indoor renovation.
4. Sensor Networks: Sensor network can take on one of the following forms: chem-
ical/biological weapon detection, environmental sensing network, city traffic con-
gestion monitoring network, military sensor network for enemy detection and etc.
5. Emergency Response Networks: Ad hoc network addresses the need of im-
mediate network deployment with high data connectivity on scene which current
network infrastructure cannot offer. Thus they are suitable for search and rescue
operations, law enforcement and disaster relief efforts.
86. Vehicle Networks: A network is formed among moving vehicles and land trans-
portation infrastructure e.g. traffic lights and electronic road signs, to help divert
the traffic away from congestion area, thereby ensuring smooth traffic flow.
7. Military Networks: At the battle field where the luxury to set up communication
infrastructures might not be present, ad hoc networking offers an extremely useful
solution for instant military communications.
1.2.3 Research Challenges
Due to their inherent flexibility, MANETs have the potential to serve as an ubiquitous
platform, interconnecting thousand of devices and supporting a wide range of network-
ing applications. It is foreseeable in the future that MANETs will serve as an effective
complement to existing wired LANs and possibly to emerging technologies such as Wire-
less Personal Area Networks (WPANs) or Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) [12].
However, the current MANETs technologies are far from maturity. A set of unique chal-
lenges such as mobile and data management, multi-hop routing, QoS support and MAC
protocols, awaits to be resolved. We briefly summarized the important ones:
1. Medium Access Control: MAC protocols can broadly be classified as controlled
or random. In networking terminology, a MAC protocol performs the role of a
traffic-cop regulating access to the shared medium by defining the communication
rules that will allow nodes within the network to ”talk” to each other in an orderly
and efficiently manner. Controlled-access protocols allows channel access by us-
ing a centralized controller while random-access protocols compete for the channel
in a random, and uncoordinated fashion, which makes it impossible to avoid col-
lisions. The most well-known controlled-access MAC is the Ethernet standard
based on Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
while for random-access MAC, the IEEE 802.11 standard which operates using
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) has been
immensely successful in gaining acceptance. However in wireless environments,
the presence of fundamentally different conditions e.g. lack of coordination au-
thority, dynamic topology, half-duplex operation, unreliable links presents various
9technical challenges, and hence arose the need for different types of MAC proto-
cols. It is well known that random access protocols suffer from the hidden and
exposed station problems. The current wisdom adopted against the hidden station
problem is to use Virtual Carrier Sensing which consists of two additional con-
trol frames, Request-To-Send (RTS) and Clear-To-Send (CTS). However, although
the hidden station problem is alleviated to a large extent with this mechanism, it
exacerbates the exposed station phenomenon on the other hand. As for controlled-
access protocols, examples include Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA), token passing and etc. The main problem with
controlled-access protocols is caused by the frequent, dynamic change in network
topology in ad hoc networks which necessitates frequent rearrangement e.g. re-
assignment of TDMA time slots.
2. Routing: Routing is arguably the most important aspect in ad hoc networks since
the network topology changes frequently and multi-hop communication is essential.
There are two classes of routing protocols: proactive and reactive. Proactive pro-
tocols are table driven protocols where every node keeps a table of all the routing
information of all the nodes it knows even if the route is not being utilized. This
routing information is updated periodically. Reactive protocols will search for a
feasible route on a demand basis only upon request. The pros of proactive proto-
cols is that they give shorter end-to-end delay since the route information is always
available and up-to-date as compared to their reactive counterparts. However, the
downside is that they are rather resources consuming since a considerable amount
of overheads are incurred at every route information update. Examples of proac-
tive protocols are Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV), Clusterhead-
Gateway Switching Routing (CGSR), Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP), Fisheye
State Routing (FSR) and etc. Examples of reactive protocols are Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR), Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance-Vector (AODV), Temporally Or-
dered Routing Algorithm (TORA) and etc. The key is perhaps to find the optimal
balance between proactive and reactive protocol mechanisms, an issue that is ac-
tively being looked into. In addition, there is a need to provide Quality-of-Service
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(QoS) in view of the multimedia-nature of future network traffic. This area is
riddled with difficulties since the dynamic nature of ad hoc network makes main-
taining the precise link state information extremely hard. Even then, QoS cannot
be guaranteed after resource reservation due to the frequent disconnections and
topology changes.
3. Power Conservation: In mobile devices, power is regarded as a precious com-
modity and networking is one of the most energy consuming operations. The
correct operation of the network requires not only the correct execution of critical
network functions by each participating node but it also requires that each node
performs a fair share of the functions [13]. The latter requirement is a strong lim-
itation for wireless mobile nodes whereby power saving is a major concern. There
are two possible settings in ad hoc networks with regards to energy: (1) energy
is an expensive, but not a limited resource (battery can be recharged/replaced
easily), (2) energy is limited/finite. The first scenario is true of community and
enterprise networking. Thus the objective is to minimize the energy consumed per
packet from the source to the destination without regards for the residual energy.
The finite energy scenario is true in sensor energy where the objective is to maxi-
mize the network lifetime besides conserving energy for individual nodes. Residual
energy is taken into consideration in this case. Current researches tackles energy
conservation across multiple layers from the operating system, physical layer, MAC
sublayer, network layer, up to the application layer.
4. Security: Enforcing security on ad hoc network is extremely difficult. There
are several key characteristics that contribute to the problem as compared to the
infrastructure-based network.
(a) Channel vulnerability - Wireless channels function in broadcast mode that
allows message eavesdropping and injection easily.
(b) Node vulnerability - As nodes do not reside in physically protected places,
thus they can be attacked easily.
(c) Absence of infrastructure - The relevant certification/authetication authorities
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cannot be easily setup and are absent.
(d) Dynamically changing network topology - This puts the security of routing
protocols under various threats.
(e) Power and computational limitations - Due to this limitation, complex en-
cryption algorithm cannot be implemented and utilized.
Security attacks fall under two types: passive and active. In a passive attack, a
malicious node either ignores operations assigned to it (e.g. silent discard, partial
routing information hiding), or listens to the channel, attempting to retrieve valu-
able information. This type of attack does not require a malicious node injecting
any message to the network. It is hard to distinguish ignorance to operations from
normal network failures. The second type of attack inserts bogus information into
the network, messing up network operations or some nodes maybe harmed. Exam-
ples include I.D. impersonation/spoofing, modification, fabrication and disclosure
attack.
In ad hoc networks, there are no guarantees that nodes will cooperate. As a
result, routing-forwarding misbehavior arises. Regardless of whether the node has
the malicious intention of damaging the network or is selfish in nature trying to
conserve battery life for its own communication, by simply not participating in
the routing protocol or by not executing packet forwarding, this kind of behavior
will endanger the correct operation of the entire network. The only way to counter
misbehavior is to enforce cooperation. Some possible solutions that can be deployed
would be for example, the detection and isolation of misbehaving nodes using some
monitoring mechanisms or by implementing reputation mechanisms to build up
individual node’s reputation during the networking process or discourage selfishness
by providing incentives thereby promoting cooperation.
1.3 State of the Art
As of now, the research communities have proposed a few classes of solutions in an effort
towards addressing the problem of misbehavior in MANETs. The main solutions are
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geared towards using secure routing, economic incentives, detection and reputation sys-
tems. Secure routing aims at adopting security mechanisms to help in the establishment
and maintenance of routes. Economic incentives such as payment or counter schemes
try to provide some form of monetary rewards such that nodes would be encouraged to
carry out packet forwarding for other nodes. We will further describe and discuss several
approaches in the later chapters.
In METEOR, we proposed a system combined with evolving detection strategies,
isolation and path management/assist. Unlike existing approaches, our system is design
to perform on top of reactive per-hop-based routing protocol such as AODV and not
a source-based routing protocol such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) which most
existing add-on misbehavior mitigation protocols are designed to do. In that respect,
we think METEOR is more scalable as compared to the rest. In addition, we do not
suffer from the effects of distortion of reputation values that may possibly plague any
reputation-based systems.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. We have proposed a simple protocol that works on a reactive hop-based routing
protocol such as AODV. Existing add-on misbehavior mitigation schemes are de-
signed for source-based routing protocol such as DSR.
2. We have made enhancements to the normal watchdog mechanism to lower the rate
of false classification while maintaining the level of true classification.
3. We have presented a method known as the HELPER-node finding to perform
alternative route-assistances whenever packet-forwarding failure is observed at the
next hop. The objective is to help in the salvaging of more dropped data packets
whenever possible so that they can be successfully delivered to the final destination
node rather than just being dropped by the misbehaving node.
4. We have also presented a dynamic algorithm that changes the classification-threshold
and service exclusion time of misbehaving node taking into account the number of
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surrounding neighbors and the observed number of misbehaving attempts of the
misbehaving node. This second chance redemption mechanism ensures that we
do not fully isolate the misbehaving nodes while further penalizing them if they
misbehave again.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the general
concepts of security, as well as the various vulnerabilities and cooperation issues that can
arise under MANETs. In addition, we also briefly explain the routing protocol, AODV,
which we use. In Chapter 3, we give the state of the art in coping with misbehavior in
MANETs, namely intrusion detection, payment systems, and detection and reputation
approaches. We present our protocol, METEOR, in Chapter 4 presenting details on the
system component compositions as well as providing a detailed protocol walk-through.
We then evaluate its performance in Chapter 5 through simulations results generated
via the network simulation tool, GlomoSim. Finally, conclusions and other future work
discussions are outlined in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Background Information
In this chapter, we provide a brief introduction to basic concepts to be used for the
rest of the thesis. First, we do a review of general networking security followed by a
discussion of the cooperation issues that can occur across the different Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) protocol stacks. We then talk about the security challenges present
under MANETs due to their special properties. Since METEOR is designed to work
on top of a routing protocol such as AODV, we also review the possible threats that
can manifest themselves in routing. Lastly, we will restrict our description of routing in
MANETs in this chapter to only AODV which is used by METEOR to demonstrate its
effectiveness against misbehavior in MANETs.
2.1 Brief Review of Network Security
This section presents some of the necessary security requirements, possible attacks in
traditional networks and further additional considerations for MANETs.
1. Authentication: Authentication is needed in order to be certain about the actual
identity of the sender or the receiver of a message. The attack that is performed
on this metric is known as masquerading, which is to pass off as somebody else. As
there is no central authority available in MANETs to store certificates and provide
key distributions in order to authenticate node identities, detection of corrupted




2. Confidentiality: This concerns about the content of a message. By definition,
only the sender and receiver are supposed to know about the message content.
Possible attacks that can be conducted include message interception (man-in-the-
middle attacks), content release to other parties, etc. The very nature of wireless
links usage in MANETs makes it easy to eavesdrop on-going communications be-
tween nodes.
3. Integrity: Data integrity ensures that the transmitted information arrives at the
destination unmodified during the transit. Strictly speaking, alteration of data can
only be done by authorized parties. Packet modification includes writing, changing,
changing status, deleting, creating, and the delaying or replaying of transmitted
messages.
4. Availability: Availability to services or devices can be restricted by running some
form of denial of service attacks against the nodes. Traditionally, this is done by
interruption, network or server overloading. As MANETs are formed by energy-
constraints devices with limited bandwidth, sleep deprivation (engaging the devices
CPU until the battery power is exhausted) or incorrect forwarding of messages are
effective attacks. Network overloading is also easy to achieve by pumping bogus
data packets to flood the network since it is difficult to detect bogus packets in a
dynamic environment.
5. Access Control: Access to resources, services or data to special identities accord-
ing to their access rights or group memberships is enforced using access control.
Access control in a way enforces network authorization. To bypass access control,
masquerading, message interception, modification, forging, etc can be employed.
As mentioned before, since MANETs are infrastructure-less and highly dynamic,
it becomes hard to detect corrupted nodes. To effectively exercise access control,
distributed authentication management control is needed.
6. Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation is about not being able to deny having sent
or received a message at a later period. A typical attack is identity masquerading.
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Either deliberate or accidental, threats endanger or compromise the security of the
system. Safe guarding techniques can be enforced through physical control, mechanism,
policy and procedures to protect assets from threats. In the absence of any safeguarding
mechanisms, vulnerabilities can arise. Attacks are conducted by exploiting those vulner-
abilities. Attacks can be passive or active in nature and their sole main purposes are to
interrupt service availability, interception for confidentiality, integrity modification and
fabrication for authenticity.
2.2 Cooperation States across Protocol Stacks
As observed in [14], misbehavior can occur under the various protocol stacks of the
OSI layer namely the MAC-layer, the network layer, the transport layer and lastly the
middleware/application layer. For the sake of completeness, the various deviating mis-
behavior will be described briefly. For more information, we refer the interested reader
to look up the paper in [14]. The various manner in which nodes can resist cooperation
under the respective protocol stacks are as follows:
• MAC Layer: The current de facto MAC standard for MANET is the IEEE 802.11
protocol. It is based on a fully distributed mechanism called the Distributed Co-
ordination Function (DCF) that aims to prevent unfair channel utilization and
resolve contention among the different nodes. After a transmission session, all
nodes are required to select a backoff value from a preset range to begin their
backoff session which serves to enforce the principle that no nodes can transmit
consecutively to ensure fairness in the long run. Deviating nodes can thus circum-
vent this mechanism in two ways: (i) selecting smaller backoff values, not using
those that is specified by the protocol; (ii) using a totally different retransmission
strategy.
• Network Layer: All MANET nodes are equipped with the capability to do basic
routing and forwarding. Nodes are required to perform all these regularly for
other nodes forming the basis of fundamental operations for MANETs. However,
these activities consume precious resources which the nodes might want to use
for their own communications. Nodes normally execute the following protocol
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non-compliant behavior for their own benefits: (i) the node performs selective
forwarding by inspecting the incoming packets. For those with source/destination
addresses different from itself, it discards them; (ii) nodes prevent themselves from
being included in route paths by not performing the routing function so that they
will never need to do forwarding. Routing packets not of interest will never be relay
to its neighbors. Under both reactive and proactive protocols, these uncooperative
nodes do not propagate routing information throughout the entire network.
• Transport Layer: The issues identified at this layer are concerned mainly with
the TCP congestion control mechanism which has already been well investigated
for wired networks. If the sender misbehaves by not obeying the appropriate
congestion control algorithm, it may send more data on a larger scale than normal
nodes since TCP is a gracious protocol. Similarly, the receiver can maximize its
own data throughput by returning more acknowledgments back to the sender. In
the MANETs context, events such as route failures or changes can seriously disrupt
the normal functioning of TCP. Packets dropped at intermediate nodes because of
route changes will wrongly be misinterpreted as congestion problems by TCP. They
can also cause frequent out-of-order delivery, exacerbating the problem. Although
current proposed solutions call for intermediate nodes to inform the sender of route
failures, such schemes would be useless if the intermediate node happens to be a
misbehaving entity. The sender would then assume the lack of acknowledgments
to be a sign of congestion.
• Middleware/Application Layer: Cooperation at this end has not been fully
investigated since full scale commercial MANET is not in widespread use yet.
However, given that the nature of these applications fits the wired P2P paradigm,
it is expected that they inherit problems typical of P2P systems such as not sharing
their file repositories to the entire community.
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2.3 Security, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation Issues under
MANETs
From a broader perspective, cooperation issues can actually be grouped as a subset
under the security problem domain [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] in MANETs. Due to the fact
that MANETs possess inherently different and unique properties from conventional net-
works, a totally challenging set of security problems have arise. When tamper-proof
hardware and strong authentication infrastructure are not available, the reliability of
basic functions like routing can be endangered since centrally controlled mechanisms,
such as access control, will no longer work. Security mechanisms involving third parties
cannot be relied upon anymore. No classical security mechanisms can help counter a
misbehaving node in this context. With mobile nodes entering and leaving the network
creating a dynamic topology, security will have to be adaptive and scalable. Together
with the various constraints, configurations suitable for heterogeneous networking may
not work properly in an ad hoc setting.
The basic requirement for making the cooperative paradigm possible is the expected
contribution of all the entities that compose and utilize the system. With the removal of
the centralized authority, such a collaboration cannot be explicitly enforced anymore and
this increases the tendency for nodes to misbehave. As mentioned earlier on, misbehavior
can manifest under the different protocol stacks. Typically a node can misbehave: (i)
by not adhering to the protocol specifications; (ii) by optimizing a particular utility at
the expense of other nodes.
In general, there are two main reasons why nodes misbehave:
1. Selfishness: Due to the scarcity of resources (e.g. CPU cycles, battery life, band-
width), nodes are unwilling to forward packets that do not serve its own interest
although it expects others to do it on its behalf. In this sense, the node makes use
of the network but does not give back any useful services although no damage is
inflicted on the network. In general, nodes tend to be selfish when cooperation is
needed to offer their own services to other nodes without any enumerations being
provided.
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2. Greediness: Acting on the basis of its greedy nature, a node try to achieve as much
network resources for its own interest. The attempted maximization of the node’s
own rewards results in an unfair allocation of resources. Similar to the selfishness
nature, no actual damage is done on the network. Greediness arises whenever
nodes are in competition for some particular resources and hence naturally they
would want to maximize their own share.
2.3.1 Uncooperative Behavior Structure Definition
The display of uncooperative behavior among nodes threatens the operation integrity
of the entire MANETs community. Different consequences ranging from unavailability
of optimal paths to overloading of cooperative nodes and forcing them to abandon the
community may result. In the worse case, the network may become totally partitioned.
This kind of problems have already been observed on P2P file distribution systems such
as in Gnutella; the number of users providing content to the network pales in comparison







Figure 2.1: The Terminology of Elementary Cooperation.
The elementary concept of cooperation is that an entity A acts on behalf of an entity
B [20]. Entity A is called the agent entity and entity B referred to as the principal
entity. For example, a network protocol entity, i.e. the agent entity, forwards packets
on behalf of its sender, i.e. the principal entity. Hence the principal entity remunerates
the agent entity and this rewarding simulates the agent entity’s action (refer to Figure
2.1). However, note that the action may not necessarily originate from the principal
entity. From a service-oriented perspective, the agent entity is viewed as the provider of
a service and the principal entity as the consumer.
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A flow diagram of uncooperative behavior is given in Figure 2.2. Uncooperative
behavior can be categorized into two types: unreasonable (i.e. misbehavior) and reason-
able (i.e. venial noncooperation). Venial noncooperation is closely related to MANETs’
asymmetry nature (the existent of inherent principal or agent entities), together with
the topology, resources and usage patterns. The reasonableness aspect stems as a result
of resource shortages. Resource shortages arise because of the limitations of the device
itself, i.e. limitations in computation, memory, bandwidth and energy capacity. Tran-
sient resource shortages are due to the device’s environment and usage patterns. The
device could be experiencing short term connectivity problems or its resources might
be overloaded perhaps due to a routing bottleneck. Going by this reasoning, venial










by agent by principal
Figure 2.2: The Uncooperative Behavior Taxonomy.
Going one level down the tree, misbehavior branches out into two forms: unprofitable
and profitable. Unprofitable misbehavior will only be exhibited if it is profitable to the
protocol entity of an upper layer. For example, to perform defamation against others,
the network protocol entity need to utilize resources (send packets) and hence is not
profitable. However the application protocol entity benefits since a competing service
provider is excluded from the network due to its bad reputation. In general, unprofitable
misbehavior is termed malicious behavior.
Both principal and agent entity may exhibit profitable misbehavior. The principal
entity may lavishly consume services, e.g. sending superfluous datagrams on the network
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layer while the agent entity may intentionally fail to perform an action in order to econ-
omize its resources, e.g. fail to forward packets. Broadly speaking, effective misbehavior
requires vertical interaction of the protocol entities in order to be effective. This applies
to both profitable and unprofitable misbehavior.
2.3.2 Difficulities of Enforcing Security under MANETs
The very nature of MANETs that differentiates them from fixed networks or infrastructure-
based wireless networks also makes the implementation of security services very much
harder. Most importantly, they can also even exhibit vulnerabilities that are totally
different and unique from traditional networks:
• Unreliable wireless links make it easy to perform jamming and their inherent
broadcasting nature also facilitates eavesdropping.
• Resource Constraints in bandwidth, computing power and battery power will
lead to various tradeoffs between resource longevity and the hardness of security
that can be implemented. Preferably, the computations and overheads should be
as low as possible in order to get the best performance out of such devices.
• Mobility/Dynamics makes the detection of behavior anomalies such as bogus
route advertisement extremely difficult since the routes in the environment change
very often. The deployment of traditional security safeguarding measures is made
even tougher because the notion of being inside or outside the network cannot be
clearly defined.
• Self-Organization is one of the main advantages MANETs offer. The reliance
on central authorities and infrastructures is removed. As such, any form of trust
management mechanism has to be adaptive and distributed. However, the re-
moval of centralized authorities dramatically increases the fault tolerance ability
of MANETs since the potential bottleneck link has been removed.
• Latency is increased by the fact devices can choose to power down to save battery
power when there are no messages for them and periodically powering back up
to check for any new messages. This inherently increases the reaction time of the
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device. In addition, the round-trip-time is increased in wireless multi-hop networks
due to medium unreliability. Thus any form of security message exchanges are
made more expensive.
• Multiple Paths can easily be set up given sufficient node density. This feature
can be exploited to MANETs benefit for diversity coding. Multiple copies of a
packet or even segments of it can be sent over different paths to ensure that a
packet actually reaches the destination unchanged.
2.4 Network Routing Threats
The primary focus of our research is on how to address and mitigate the various MANETs
network routing threats in particular uncooperative MANETs routing. Specifically, at-
tacks on routing protocols can be classified as non-forwarding (current efforts are di-
rected mostly at this most basic form of misbehavior [21, 22]), traffic-deviations and
route-modifications, lack of error messages and finally frequent route updates. In [23],
the authors presented a security model in relation to the main threats under MANETs
routing protocols which can also serve as the basis for generic security requirements.
They are listed as follows:
• Confidentiality : In the context of routing protocols, the main confidentiality
threat is with references to the routing information which when revealed will then
pose further threats to other secondary forms of information such as the network
topology, geographical location and etc.
• Integrity : In line with normal protocol functioning procedures, all the nodes will
perform correct routing operations so that they have the necessary and correct
information. Thus the integrity threat points to those nodes that either purposely
introduced falsified routing information or alter existing information.
• Availability : If any node is able to obtain routes that defines the paths to some
particular node when they need it, then it is said that the availability factor is
present. In addition, no routing operation should take excessive time, preventing
nodes from receiving up-to-date information. Nodes should also be able to carry
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out normal operations without excessive interference from the routing protocol or
security.
• Authorization : An unauthorized node is one that is not allowed access to routing
information and hence not allow to participate in the routing protocol operations.
However it must be mentioned that concept is somewhat of an abstract notion.
Formal identity authentication is a very important aspect of security requirement
as it helps to enforce network access control, preventing abuse of the network.
• Dependability and Reliability : The greatest advantage MANETs possess over
traditional wired networks is that it allows networks to be setup on the fly as and
when they are required such as in emergency situations. Thus the reliability factor
and necessary conditions must be present. Take for the case when a node’s routing
table becomes full due to memory constraints, a reactive protocol must still be
able to find an emergency route to a given destination within a certain time.
• Accountability : To adequately protect against actions that might compromised
network security, actions must be logged and protected for retrieval later if nec-
essary to carry out corrective and preventive measurements. At the every least,
these misbehavior must be detectable. Event logging also helps in providing non-
repudiation to later guard against a node’s denial in a security violation.
As adopted in [23], the threat model used distinguishes between both external and in-
ternal attacks. External attacks are those carried out by outside the network nodes/entities.
Attacks launched by known nodes internal to the network are then intuitively known as
internal attacks. Hence these attacks are actually launched by authorized and trusted
nodes. As can be deduced, threats arising internally are more difficult to detect com-
pared to those from external sources. The interest and focus of this thesis will be directed
solely at addressing internal threats.
As internal nodes probably have the necessary information to participate in dis-
tributed networking operations, thus the threats in turn posed by them are hugely mag-
nified. These nodes can misbehave in a variety of manners as identified by the following
four categories: as failed nodes, as badly failed nodes, as selfish nodes and lastly as
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malicious nodes. Note that varying degrees of incorrect node behavior may be displayed
by two nodes of the same category such as one can be more selfish than the other. Also
a node can demonstrate behavior from more than one category. In this manner, it is
a more realistic and truthful representation of the behaviors present in the real world
environment.
1. Failed Nodes: Failed nodes are those which are unable to perform an operation
for certain unintentional reasons such as power failure or environmental hindrances.
Since the upholding of MANETs relies on information which are distributed for its
robustness, the failure of nodes would result in fresh, updated routing information
from not being properly distributed throughout the network. These information
could be related to security such as authentication or routing. The failure would
also mean that originator nodes will not learn of any broken links and continue
to utilize them, creating unnecessary burden on the network. The worst case of a
failed node would be that the node is part of an emergency route or a secure route.
2. Badly Failed Nodes: Nodes of this nature display the same characteristics of
failed nodes such as not sending or forwarding data packets or route messages.
In addition, they can also send false yet correctly formatted routing messages.
Routing messages for a certain node which has dropped out of the network is
one such example. This presents a threat to the network integrity. Another side
effect arising in response to that kind of messages is that nodes on the network
might attempt to search for missing nodes. This places unnecessary burden on the
network and results in the wasting of precious resources. In the extreme case, it can
be adopted as a tactic for denial-of-service attacks since the network can potentially
be overwhelmed by the huge volume of error messages generated because of the
failure to find the supposedly present missing nodes.
3. Selfish Nodes: Exploiting routing protocols to their own advantage are typical
behavior displayed by selfish nodes. They normally do it in order to enhance their
own performance or save the resources for their own use. Whenever the routing
protocol calls for cooperation which requires some personal costs to be borne by
the selfish nodes, they will always act like failed nodes. Packet dropping is the
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most common behavior exhibited by selfish node as most routing protocols do not
incorporate mechanisms to detect them. Partial dropping is another form of mis-
behavior which is even more difficult to detect and prevent than total dropping of
packets. Such behavior makes it hard to differentiate which actions are intentional
and which are not. This is thus an effective way of avoiding detection by the selfish
nodes if some detection schemes were ever to be deployed on the network. Finally,
note that selfish nodes do not act to compromise network integrity and operation
by attacking or falsifying routing information. Protecting their own interest re-
main their top main priority. Models to investigate such behavior in a distributed
setting already exist [24] for wired networks but that can easily be applied over to
the wireless domain without much difficulties.
4. Malicious Nodes: Malicious node start out with the intent to deliberately disrupt
the network topology, messing up the legitimate operation of the routing proto-
col and denying services between nodes. They are not interested in the game of
maximizing incentives for their own interest. Hence they normally carry out denial
of service attacks, compromised the network integrity, misdirected traffic, exploit
route maintenance and etc. The effect of malicious node can be felt the most when
they are the only link between groups of neighbor nodes. Analogously, node of
this nature can be viewed as nodes that have infiltrated the opposite enemy camps
entrusted with the role of sabotaging.
2.5 The AODV Protocol
The Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol was one of the
earliest routing protocol developed for routing in MANETs and was proposed by Perkins,
Royer and Das [25]. It is currently one of the only few that have already been ratified
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It is a stateless and reactive protocol
that establishes routes only when needed by a source node using route request (RREQ)
and route reply (RREP) messages.
When a route to the destination node is needed, a RREQ is broadcast by a node to
its surrounding neighbors. Upon receipt of a RREQ, a node sets up reverse routes to the
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source node in the routing tables and updates the sequence number of the source node.
If the node is the destination node or the node already possess a route to the destination
that meets the requirements, it then unicasts a RREP back to the source node. The
source node or the intermediate node that receives the RREP will update its forward
route to the destination in its routing table. Otherwise, the source node will continue
to re-broadcast the RREQ using the expanding ring search technique until a RREP is
received or the edge of the network is reached. Hence, if any node receives a RREQ it
has already seen earlier on, it discards the RREQ and does not forward it. This helps
to prevent any potential broadcast storms during the route searching process, thereby
conserving valuable resources.
Under AODV, the generation of sequence number (SN) plays an important role
to ensure the freshness of the routing information and to guarantee loop-free routes.
Sequence number is incremented under the following two conditions: (i). when the
source initiates a RREQ and, (ii). the destination replies with a RREP. SN can only
be updated by the source or the destination nodes. A hop count (HC) metric is used
to determine the shortest path and is increased by one if RREQ or RREP is forwarded
along each hop.
When a link is broken, a node will initially try to perform local repair without
informing the route source node. Only if the route is deemed to be totally unrepairable
after the salvage attempt, then route error messages (RERR) are propagated back to
the source node via the reverse route entries. All previous intermediate nodes along that
route will erase the particular entry in their routing tables upon receipt of the RERR.
Connectivity information to the neighboring one-hop nodes is maintained periodically in
the form of a local table via the receipt of HELLO messages as sent out by its neighbors.
If the HELLO message validity period has lapsed and no new HELLO messages are
received, that particular neighbor node is deemed to have moved away from the local
node’s neighborhood. The corresponding entry is then removed from the table.
Chapter 3
State of the Art
The existing approaches for addressing the problem of misbehavior in MANETs com-
prises of secure routing, economic incentives, detection, reputation and response systems.
Economic incentives methods such as payment or token-counter schemes are designed
specially to combat the issue of packet forwarding. Secure routing on the other hand
aims at protecting the establishment and maintenance of routes.
The other broad class of schemes are based on the detection, reputation and response
systems. They aim at reactively detecting misbehavior and pro-actively isolating misbe-
haved nodes to prevent further damage. Theoretically, they are able to guard against any
kind of misbehavior so long the misbehavior is detectable, i.e. observable and classifiable
with a relatively high probability.
To combat misbehavior, mitigation schemes for cooperation are indispensable. These
schemes will have to be carefully designed in order to discourage uncooperative behavior,
while at the same time taking into account the high heterogeneity of the devices, the
resulting asymmetry of cooperation and the fact that certain devices may have valid
reasons for showing a lack of cooperation, which logically means that they should not
then come under any form of punishments by the schemes.
In the following sections, we describe the main features of some proposals within the
respective solution tracks, briefly describe how they work, what do they guard against
and some of the open problems they faced.
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3.1 Existing Main Solution Approaches
As we saw in the previous chapter, uncooperative behavior can occur across different
layers of protocol stacks. Thus, current researches are proceeding on different fronts,
separately for each protocol stack. Existing proposed solutions for the MAC and trans-
port layer are not targeted in the typical nature of MANETs since these problems can
occur under both wireless and wired networks. The identified network layer issues are
the ones that have arisen within the ad hoc networks context. Current solutions can be
grouped according to the mechanisms adopted to enforce cooperation:
1. Modifying the specific protocol to incorporate features that would counter misbe-
havior and strengthen cooperation.
2. Treating the entire MANET as one whole system and use distributed intrusion-
based techniques to monitor for any signs of traffic anomalies.
3. Providing incentives mechanisms to reward well-behaved nodes and punish mis-
behaving ones. The incentives can be classified into two types: reputation and
price-based.
Protocol modifications have been proposed for the MAC and transport layer pro-
tocols. The main changes deal mainly with the backoff value and congestion-control-
windows mechanism. In this thesis, we only discuss MAC layer misbehavior. For
intrusion-based techniques, distributed real-time traffic monitoring is conducted by mod-
ules located at every node. Anomalies analyzing and reporting is also localized. As for
incentive-based mechanisms, there are two classes of incentives: reputations and price.
The network layer adopts both kinds of incentives, using them to induce node coopera-
tion. In the following subsections, we will detail their main features.
3.2 Handling MAC Layer Misbehavior
The problem of the greedy sender has long existed under infrastructure-based wireless
networks. Hence they can easily be extended over to the MANETs context. The solutions
proposed [26, 27] require the presence of trusted based stations that can identify sender
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misbehavior and some slight modifications to the IEEE 802.11 DCF mechanism. Since
base stations are normally controlled by some central authority, they are supposed to
be well-behaved when sending data. The main problem arises when the greedy sender
communicates with the base stations and during the process alters the backoff value
thereby allowing them to send with increased frequency as compared to other regular
nodes.
The proposed solution empowers the receiver with the task of calculating the backoff
value instead of the sender. Rather than letting the sender select random backoff values
to initiate the backoff counter, the receiver sends the value it has selected to the sender
in the CTS and ACK packets. The sender is then required to use the assigned values.
Hence, the receiver can monitor the number of idle slots the sender has actually waited
before it initiates the next round of packet transmissions. Any deviations would imply
that the sender is misbehaving. At the next round, the receiver would penalize the
sender by increasing the next backoff value assigned to it.
Similarly, the receiver can also misbehave by sending smaller backoff values to the
sender with the intention of obtaining a higher data rate from the sender. The solution
proposed is to allow the receiver to select a value from some well-known determinis-
tic function which the other party is also aware of. Upon detection of misbehavior,
the sender then waits for a longer period before proceeding with further transmissions.
However, despite the possible attacks that can be realized, link layer protocol alteration
is still probably the most difficult to manipulate of all since normally the MAC protocol
is already directly implemented in the silicon chips in modern devices. This makes it
difficult to carry out protocol modifications since special equipments and knowledge are
required and thus provides an implicit form of protection.
3.3 Payment and Rewarding Based Systems
The idea of using incentives to reward nodes in order to encourage cooperation is not new.
This methodology has long existed under wired P2P systems and is a well researched
field. Unsurprisingly, they have already been applied to multi-hop cellular networks
[28]. Incentive mechanisms operate on the assumption that nodes are rational and will
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cooperate only if it brings benefits to them in the presence of scarce resources.
A couple of schemes specifically directed at MANETs have been devised using this
kind of mechanism. As proposed in [29, 30], nuggets are preloaded into the security
modules of the mobile devices while some other schemes [31] introduced the use of
electronic cash, which can be purchased and converted back to real cash. These incentives
are paid to intermediate nodes for the services they provide to the entire network. The
key idea is that nodes that provide services such as routing, packet forwarding and
etc. should be remunerated for the resources expended while nodes receiving a service
should be charged. Based on this concept, nodes are forced to cooperate since they will
eventually use up their initial allocated amount of virtual currencies if they only send
packets and not participate in the forwarding of packets for other nodes. Only when
they provide network services for others, they can then earn new currencies for their own
use. Thus through this mutual exchange of behavior between nodes, cooperation can be
enforced implicitly. Expectedly, any rational node’s objective would be to maximize the
amount of nuglets or cash in their possession.
Although systems of this nature have the potential to improve the network perfor-
mance against selfish nodes, there is argument [32] on whether there is a real need for
them, especially in the early stages of MANET adoption, where excessive complexity
can only hurt the technology’s deployment. In addition, a general solution may not be
appropriate; incentive systems should be tailored to the needs of each individual appli-
cation. There have also been attempts [33] to model the effects incentives imposed on
MANETs using fluid-level based simulations.
3.3.1 Requirements
When designing incentive schemes, the primary objectives are to foster cooperation and
discourage uncooperative behavior. Hence, certain requirements must be met [20]:
• Effectiveness: Generally speaking, an effective incentive scheme should ideally
restrains uncooperative behavior except for venial noncooperation. Through remu-
neration, we can achieve bi-directional cooperation for both the agent and principal
entity: selfish behavior would seems less attractive to the former while the latter is
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prevented from behaving in a lavish manner. However, detection and punishment
of malicious behavior demands for additional mechanisms for the implementation.
To detect and circumvent venial noncooperation, additional mechanisms also need
to be adopted. Asymmetric cooperation patterns can normally be taken care of by
applying flexible remuneration.
• Trust: Depending on how the scheme is formulated, trust either serves as an in-
centive for cooperation or a prerequisite for remuneration mechanisms. Viewed
from the perspective of the principal and agent entities, trust presents a totally
different outlook. The principal entity has to ensure that the agent entities not
only act as specified but they also shouldn’t be able to alter or duplicate the remu-
neration. On the other hand, the agent entity has to ensure that the remuneration
received should be of the correct amount. In practice, trust mechanisms usually
utilize two kinds of trust, i.e. static and dynamic trust. Static trust refers to a
statement of trust that remains valid at the time of issue till the point it is revoked.
This is the kind of trust mechanism that has been implemented in existing public
key infrastructure frameworks. Dynamic trust on the other hand arises as a result
of prior experiences with an entity and is continuously changing according to its
behavior. Normally, outlets for learning can be achieved by using mechanisms to
diffuse reputation and/or by sniffing. An important point to note is to render
dynamic trust dependable, diffusion paths must be made trackable.
• Robustness: Incentives schemes are conceived to restrain misbehavior. However,
without proper measures in place, they will encourage further selfish and malicious
behavior through the abuse of remunerations. In a wired setting, the trust in-
frastructure provides robustness via integrity, authentication and non-repudiation
against those misbehavior. One possible resolution would be to adopt tamper
resistance hardware solutions that might solve parts of the problem but not en-
tirely. Electronic/virtual cash also calls for an oﬄine, token based and trans-
ferrable electronic payment schemes. Such a scheme will need to prevent dou-
ble spending and forgery which can be done using the tamper resistant hardware
or pre-authorization. Transferability is yet another desirable feature of the elec-
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tronic/virtual cash model which is not supported by most schemes now.
There is yet another class of incentive-based mechanisms [34, 35, 36, 37, 38] conceived
using economic models from the perspective of Game Theoretical concepts. They aim
mainly to provide resource balancing in the various areas. These schemes attempt to
change the dominant strategy of selfish participants to one that produces a desirable
equilibrium (also known as the Nash equilibria) via the use of virtual commodity in
order to counteract nodes’ attempts to conserve physical resources such as memory,
CPU cycles, I/O resources, battery power. However, this class of schemes currently
still lies very much in the theoretical analysis phase. The details and complexity of
the actual technical implementations are still murky and could be too overwhelming for
real-life systems.
The greatest drawback of the incentive scheme is that the use of monetary rewards
can become temptations for cheating. There are security concerns involving the estab-
lishment of node identities and ensuring the integrity of the virtual currencies during the
transit process. The solutions to circumvent these problems are to use either tamper-free
security modules to calculate payments or devise some well-thought out game-theoretical
strategies so that the desired behavior results in optimum node gain for everyone. Both
solutions too have their fallible areas. Tamper-free hardware may not be cheaply avail-
able for the former while for the latter, the payment handouts for game-theoretical
methods have to be carefully chosen not only to avoid cheating but also inter-nodal
collusions.
3.3.2 Related Works
• SPRITE : SPRITE is the acronym for ”a Simple cheat-Proof, cRedIT-based sys-
tem for mobile ad-hoc networks with selfish nodes” system proposed by Zhong et al
[31]. This scheme uses credits to provide incentives to selfish nodes (refer to Figure
3.1). The charges and credit are determined by the system from a game-theoretic
perspective, motivating each node to report its action honestly, even when a col-
lection of the selfish nodes collude. The novel feature of this scheme is that it does
not require the use of any tamper-proof hardware at any node. From a high level
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perspective, the scheme functions as follows. This scheme uses a Credit Clearance
Service (CCS) to handle credits payout to nodes. When a node receives a message,
the node keeps a receipt of the message. At a later time when it has a fast connec-
tion to a CCS, it notifies the CCS by uploading the receipts of the messages it has
received/forwarded. In turn, the CCS determines the charge and credit to each
node involved in the transmission of a message, depending on the reported receipts
of the message. When a node sends messages, it loses credit since other nodes
incur a cost to forward the messages on its behalf. A preliminary implementation
of the scheme showed that the overhead of the system is insignificant. However,
the centralized handling of credit introduces new problems in itself. In addition,




Figure 3.1: The SPRITE Architecture.
Firstly, SPRITE assumes the existence of a high speed access to the wired Internet
at some point in time in order to access the CCS. However this maybe not be true
in all cases. Without the high speed access link, nodes cannot redeem their credits
and are unable to work properly. In addition, the trustworthiness of the CCS and
the criteria in which it was elected were not clearly addressed in the paper. The
proposed architecture also assumes that the CCS is located at a fixed location
which further presents a big constraint in real mobile ad hoc networks since nodes
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in the network can have varying degrees of mobility. Evidently, the CCS is a
single point of failure since nodes depend on it for incentives in order to properly
perform their roles and the CCS might be overwhelmed when the traffic volume
is abnormally high. Examples of such instances include high intensive traffic due
to a large population of nodes or a malicious distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack on the system.
• NUGLETS : The Nuglets scheme [29, 30, 39] was proposed as part of the Termin-
odes Project. It proposes the concept of virtual currency called nuglets to be used
in every transaction. Through the use of nuglets, the authors hoped to achieve
two objectives: 1) Using incentives to encourage nodes to cooperate network oper-
ations. 2) Discourage end-users from overloading the network. A tamper-resistant
security module forms the heart of this scheme. It helps to maintain the nuglets
counter which is the source of rewards for the nodes. Two conceptual charging
models for packet forwarding service were proposed: Packet Purse Model (PPM)
and Packet Trade Model (PTM).
PPM requires that the sending node pays for the packet forwarding service; the
source is required to load the packet with sufficient nuglets to enable it to reach
the destination successfully. The intermediate forwarding nodes will then charge
for their services by acquiring some nuglets from the packet. The main advantage
of this model is that nodes are deterred from sending useless data and overloading
the network. The drawback is that it is difficult to estimate the number of nuglets
(prone to both nuglets overestimation and underestimation) that are required to
reach the destination due to the dynamic changing network topology.
For PTM, packets do not carry nuglets but are instead traded for nuglets by inter-
mediate nodes: each intermediate node buys packet from the previous node on the
path. Thus eventually only the final destination node has to pay for the packet.
The direct advantage of this model is that the source node does not need to know
in advance the number of nuglets required for packet delivery but the disadvan-
tage is that we now cannot prevent nodes from overloading the network. A hybrid
model that combines the advantages of both PPM and PTM was also proposed.
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The idea is to handle the packet initially according to the PPM model until the
packet runs out of nuglets to use. Then it is handled according to the PTM model
until the destination buys it. The Nuglets scheme does not actively seek out and
isolate misbehaving nodes along any routes but only wants to foster cooperation
among all the nodes in the community. In addition, there are several limitations
to the Nuglets scheme.
For a start, the primary requirement of a tamper resistant security module to be
embedded in each node in order to protect the nuglets counter from illegitimate
access from the node itself could be unrealistic. In some cases, it might not be
possible perhaps due to the operating environment or might even add to the cost
of the device. Nuglets also make extensive use of elaborate security mechanisms
to ensure correct operation. Nuglets forgery and tampering is prevented through
the use of the security module since it contains a host of other security features
such as public key infrastructure and etc. This will add more complexity to the
operation and implementation. Predictably, the overheads can be high too when
transactions are present in high volume.
In a relatively static configuration, leaf nodes will rarely be required to forward
traffic for other nodes. Thus even if they confirm to the correct protocol function-
ing, they will not be able to gain more credits for their transmission, consequently
running out of nuglets to perform any network operations. A couple of problems
are also present in the two models. Under PPM, intermediate nodes are able to
take out more nuglets than what they are supposed to; under PTM, intermedi-
ate nodes are able to deny the forwarding service after taking out nuglets from a
packet. Lastly, if a node ever runs out of nuglets, its tamper proof hardware has
to contact some central authority in order to ”refill” its credit. This may not be
appropriate in certain situations where the nodes might have difficulty accessing
the central authority.
• Ad Hoc-VCG: The Ad Hoc-VCG [40] protocol implements a unique cost compu-
tation methodology based on a well-known VCG mechanism named after Vickrey,
Clarke and Groves. The cost per transmission is tied to the required transmission
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power. Interestingly, the authors made the cost of energy available for user adjust-
ment, allowing subjective perception of the inconvenience incurred to be factored
into the cost computation and payment strategy. However, this requires modifi-
cation of the DSR routing protocol so as to carry this new transmission power
information.
In addition to the normal DSR operation, every node has to broadcast the energy
cost and the transmission power used to transmit RREQs. All receiving nodes
repeat the same procedures except that the transmission power of the previous
node is replaced by the minimum power required for correct reception, estimated
based on the path-loss equation. Eventually, all the RREQs will arrive at the
destination and a cost tree from which a minimum cost path can be found is formed.
The destination then replies with a RREP that includes additional information for
minimum transmission power and payment per node.
No new payment methods were proposed in the Ad Hoc-VCG protocol. Instead
the authors suggested adopting the respective source models and the central bank
concepts under the works [29, 30, 31]. Emphasis was placed on the payment com-
putation component. The payment made to a forwarding node is given by the
difference between the minimum cost (excluding the cost of that node) and the
next minimum cost that does not traverse that node. This is computed at the des-
tination for each and every node on the minimum cost path. Hence, the amount
received at a node will not be equal to the cost declared. In reality, a second route
may not always be available for computation and also, the destination may not
always be trustable for computing the costs correctly too.
To cheat, a forwarding node can untruthfully declare these parameters in an effort
to increase his gain, but the attempt will be futile as the payment computation for
a node in the source model is independent of the cost and transmission power that
the node declares. Instead, if it over-declares, it risks becoming a non-minimum
route, resulting in a loss of revenue.
Another possible cheating avenue is that node can falsely declare the minimum
required energy for reception from its previous node. By over-declaring, the path
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may no longer be minimum and thus there is a possible loss of revenue. Hence the
payment the node received is decreased because the cost of the path it currently
runs on has increased. If it under-declares, the transmission may fail and will
consequently affect the payment rollout.
Under a similar motivation, a node may also attempt to modify the cost of energy
and minimum power requirements of other nodes in the RREQs and the arguments
similar to that as above apply. However, there exists one scenario in which a node
can receive a higher payment by modifying the energy cost in the RREQ of another
node. To prevent this from happening, some form of field authentication is needed.
The modification will not in any way affect the transmission power and might even
result in a reduction in the total cost of the path (excluding its own cost) it resides
on. It can also change a previously non-minimum cost path to a minimum one,
thus deriving more revenue.
3.3.3 Open Issues and Limitations
• Receipt Redemption: When the existence of a network operator is assumed,
the presence of a central bank becomes more justifiable. Such an assumption frees
certain schemes [31, 40] from relying on a tamper-free hardware module. As com-
munications to the central bank itself may require multiple hops, the preferred way
is to allow the nodes to keep the receipts [31] for claiming later via a fast connection
or using an oﬄine method. However, the central bank scenario is unrealistic under
MANETs. Another problem is with regards to the size of the receipts. Although
they may be small, hardware memory limitations can result in dropping of receipts
and poses a problem to the encouragement of cooperation when memory becomes
full. Ideally, the mechanisms should be designed such that the dropping of receipts
at one node should not affect the full redemption of rewards by another node on
the forwarding path.
• Payment Models Methodology: In the source payment method such as PTM
and Sprite, another problem surfaces with regards to unfair payment of failed
forwarding services by the source when its packets are dropped by another node.
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It is preferred that the source does not absorb the cost of misbehavior exhibited
by another node. In distinguishing deliberate from unintentional packet dropping,
the source may inevitably be required to pay for packet losses for the latter due
to the inherents unreliable nature of wireless links. Thus, routing protocols should
also factor link unreliability into consideration when doing route selection.
• Selective Response: An implicit assumption made in a number of publications
is the prospects of gaining revenue through packet forwarding would encourage
more nodes to invest their resources into routing. This would definitely depend
on how many routing packets were sent before a forwarding packet arrives. Most
importantly, bearing in mind the broadcasting nature of wireless medium and the
caching methods of routing mechanisms, neighboring nodes have partial knowledge
of the network. Such knowledge may allow them to predict with a certain prob-
ability if it will be selected for packet forwarding and hence otherwise can choose
not to respond to routing requests. This poses a serious problem as demonstrated
in [40] as the scheme requires a next best path for payment computation. Other
issues not addressed include payment for multicasting and broadcasting services.
Broadcasting is considered a subset of multicasting and similar solutions may be
applicable to both. It might also solve the problem of payment for routing services
that utilize broadcasting.
3.4 Reputation, Detection and Response Systems
Detection and Response typically use reputation-ratings, although not necessary so, to
enforce cooperation among MANETs nodes to prevent selfish behavior. The principle
of employing reputation is similar to that in the human social world. There are several
ways [41, 42, 43] in which reputation-ratings can be measured and composed under
MANETs. The main objective is aimed at identifying and isolating misbehaving nodes,
thus making denying cooperation an unattractive thing to do. In this way, it is hoped
that misbehavior can be mitigated leading to restoration of normal functioning of the
networks. The basic working concept of reputation-based mechanism is as described
below.
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All MANETs nodes can be thought of as members of a community that share a
common resource. Thus members have to contribute to the community in order to
be entitled to use those resources. However since members of the community are often
unrelated to each other, they do not have insights to each other’s inherent behavior. This
is where reputation can help contribute to this understanding. Reputation is viewed as
a good measure of a member’s contribution to the community since it is defined as the
amount of trust inspired by a particular member in a specific setting. Those members
that contribute regularly to the community enjoy good reputation and are allowed to use
the resources while uncooperative members are gradually excluded from the community
due to bad reputation.
Normally the systems consist of a network component that will monitor the activities
of neighboring nodes and a reputation-calculation component will that collect these
reputations and compute an overall score for the respective nodes and determine if
they are misbehaving or not. The reputation is calculated using the various types of
information gathered based on the degree of collaborations observed. The reputation
gathering process is usually automated. The reputation information collected can then
be kept either as private information for oneself or it can be used as a shared resource.
There are pros and cons to either approaches.
3.4.1 Related Works
• Watchdog and Path Rater : Watchdog and pathrater [44] was one of the first
few schemes that attempts to address the problem of routing misbehaviour in
MANET. It proposes to detect and mitigate routing misbehaviour by performing
nodes categorization via dynamic measurement of node behavior through the use
of two different but complementing components, the watchdog and a pathrater.
These two components are to be implemented on top of DSR although it is claimed
that they can be generalized to other source routing protocols as well. The task of
the watchdog is to identify misbehaving nodes while the pathrater is responsible
for trust management and routing policy rating of every path used. Running in
promiscuous mode, the watchdog maintains a buffer of recently sent packets as
observed by the node. By comparing with any overheard packet transmissions, the
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node can determine whether the packets have indeed been forwarded. If so, the
corresponding packet is flushed from the buffer. After a timeout period has lapsed
and the bandwidth threshold has been exceeded, the node responsible for those
actions will be classified as a misbehaving node. The advantage of the watchdog
is that it can detect misbehaviour at the networking level and not just the link
level. However, it is susceptible to the following factors that will influence its
perception of a misbehaving node: 1) ambiguous collisions, 2) receiver collisions,
3) limited transmission power, 4) false misbehaviour, 5) collusion, and finally 6)
partial dropping. We refer the interested reader to [44] for more details on how
each of these factors can influence the correct judgment capability of the watchdog.
Finally, for proper functioning of the watchdog, it must know where a packet should
be in two hops. Thus it works best when paired with a source-based routing
protocol.
The pathrater, run by each node in the network, combines the knowledge of mis-
behaving nodes with link reliability in order to pick the most reliable route using
a path metric that is formed by averaging all the node ratings in that particular
path. If there are multiple paths to the same destination, the path with the high-
est metric is chosen over the rest of the paths. This differs from the normal DSR
protocol whereby the shortest path in the route cache is chosen. Since pathrater
needs to know the exact path a packet has traversed, a source routing protocol is
the most suitable. The pathrater will assign nodes that it knows of initially with a
score of 0.5 and itself with a score of 1.0. On actively used paths, the node ratings
are increased by 0.01 every 200 ms and the maximum attainable score is 0.8. The
scores are decreased by 0.05 when the node is unreachable due to link-breakage
or some other reasons. If a node is suspected of misbehaviour by the watchdog
mechanism, it is marked with a special high negative score of -100 so that the
effects will be apparent during calculation of the metric. However, in order not
to permanently exclude the node, the ratings will be slowed restored after a long
timeout. Note that nodes not being used actively do not have their ratings mod-
ified by the pathrater. In the worse scenario whereby the pathrater cannot find a
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path that is free of misbehaving nodes, it will send out a RREQ message using a
special extension called Send Route Request (SRR).
One problem with this scheme is that the pathrater only decrements a node’s rating
upon misbehaviour detection by the watchdog mechanism. Without the watchdog,
the pathrater cannot detect misbehaving nodes. Also, as mentioned earlier, the
scheme is entirely dependant upon source-based routing protocols such as DSR.
As such, the extensibility of the scheme is suspected too.
• CONFIDANT : CONFIDANT [45] stands for ”Cooperation of Nodes, Fairness
in Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks”. The approach used in this protocol is to find the
selfish and/or misbehaving nodes and isolate them so that misbehavior will not pay
and thus they cannot continue their misbehaving ways. It is based on the principle
of selective altruism and utilitarianism. This protocol assumes that the underlying
network protocol used is DSR. There are four components to this protocol: a
reputation system, a trust manager, a monitor and a path manager. The monitor
is meant for node-behavior observation; the reputation system records first-hand
and trusted second-hand observation about routing and forwarding behavior of
other nodes; the trust manager controls trust based on received warnings; the path
manager in turn adapts node behavior according to the reputation ratings and
takes action against misbehaving nodes. The reputation here in context refers to
the proper routing and forwarding behavior functioning according to the protocol
specifications and trust refers to the participation level in the meta-protocol.
Trust relationship and routing decisions are made based on experienced, observed,
or reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. Nodes perform dy-
namic monitoring of their neighbors and change the reputation ratings accordingly.
Depending on the reputation ratings gathered, the nodes will either continue to
use those routes or take punishment actions. The punishments include deleting
or re-ranking the routes containing the misbehaving nodes from the path cache.
Future requests by badly rated nodes will also be ignored. In addition, once a node
has detected a misbehaving node, it informs other nodes by sending an ALARM
message. Nodes that have received the ALARM messages will perform evaluations
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on its own to determine how trustworthy the message is. They can then decide
whether to take punishment actions against the misbehaving node or not.
However, there are a couple of drawbacks to this scheme. Firstly, the scheme is too
closely tied to the DSR protocol. This is a big disadvantage as there is no stan-
dardized routing protocol yet for MANETs. Secondly, it relies exclusively on and
disseminates negative reputation information possibly giving rise to the problem of
false accusations. Nodes collusion has not yet been taken into account which could
further exacerbate the situation. Due to the process of reputation propagation,
extra overheads and additional traffic are generated. Lastly, the problem of over-
loading when traffic is being diverted away from misbehaving nodes to protocol-
abiding nodes that could overwork them and their intermediate links has also not
been factored into the design of the scheme.
• CORE : CORE [46] is a collaborative reputation mechanism that also incorpo-
rates the concept of a watchdog component. However the reputation mechanism
differentiates between subjective reputations (observations), indirect reputation
(positive reports by others) and functional reputation (task-specific behavior). All
these are then weighted and combined into a final value that is used to make deci-
sions about the current status of a node. In this scheme, only positive reputation
information is exchanged. The reputation values are obtained by treating nodes as
requesters and providers and comparing the expected results to the actual results
of a request. The formula used to calculate the reputation value also avoids false
detections (e.g. link breakages) by using an ageing factor that gives more relevance
to past observations than current ones. This means that frequent variations for a
node’s behavior ratings are filtered off, hence giving rise to a more stable reputation
value over time.
Aside from that, CORE also suffers from certain drawbacks. Firstly, similar to the
CONFIDANT scheme, CORE is also based on DSR. This is one big limitation since
no routing protocols have been standardized for MANETs yet. Next, the watchdog
mechanism component might not be able to properly monitor the neighborhood
in the presence of collisions, inhomogeneous transmission ranges or directional
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antennas. Thus there is always the possibility of them missing out on a misbehaving
node. There is also the issue of regular nodes being overworked as a result of
redirecting traffic away from misbehaving nodes to well-behaved ones potentially
overwhelming them with excess traffic. Lastly, CORE is still in the conceptual
phase with no simulation performance results to assess how good the protocol
actually is.
3.4.2 Open Issues and Limitations
• Intentional vs. Accidental Misbehavior: Although misbehavior can be clas-
sified as either selfishness or malice stemming from different motivation, they are
normally generalized as intentional misbehavior. However, sometimes misbehavior
can arise accidentally such as a node being unable to provide services due to a lack
of resources or due to some physical topological constraints in the network. It is
important to guard against all misbehavior regardless of their intentions.
• Node Identity: Identity is a key aspect of the reputation system. Three essential
properties of identity must be present: persistency, uniqueness and distinctness.
The requirement to be persistent means that a node cannot easily change its iden-
tity. This is to ensure that reputation systems are able to gather the past behavior
of a node by using inexpensive pseudonyms. An identity is said to be unique if no
other nodes can impersonate as other nodes. This property is needed so that we
can be sure that the behavior observed indeed belongs to that of the node being
observed. Cryptography techniques can be used in this aspect. The requirement of
distinct identities arises because of the Sybil attack whereby nodes generate several
identities for themselves to be used at the same time. This attack can influence
public opinion of itself by having its rating considered more than once. In situ-
ations where there is still Internet connectivity, we can make use of certification
authorities to perform cross checking.
• Redemption: The solution must be built such that redemption is made possible.
Reputation classification should be carried out on a periodic basis in order for nodes
that have misbehaved in the past to be given a chance back in the community in
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the future if they show signs of repent. This is possible given that the nodes each
have their own reputation belief which not necessarily shared by others. Even if the
node is excluded by everyone, it can redeem itself by means of a mechanism that
gives more weight to recent observations, decaying the ratings of past observations.
• Positive vs. Negative Ratings: Depending on whether positive or negative rat-
ings are used, they can have different ramifications on the operations of the system.
Fundamentally, it means that malicious nodes are able to deceive other ”good” na-
tured nodes in different ways. If negative ratings are disseminated between the
nodes, it is possible for malicious nodes to decrease the reputations of other nodes
by ”bad-mouthing” (false accusations) them to their neighboring nodes. However
if positive ratings are now used to avoid the previous effect, it is now possible for
the malicious node to raise the reputation (false praising) of other malicious nodes
if they somehow managed to collude. This means that over time, the number of
nodes with bad reputation might decrease through this kind of deception, making
malicious nodes even harder to detect.
• Private vs. Shared Information: If the nodes keep the classified reputation in-
formation entirely to themselves alone, there is no chance of untruthful information
being disseminated and propagated around the neighboring nodes. Shared infor-
mation on the other hand will present such problems to the system. However no
exchange of reputation information implies trading robustness for longer detection
delay since nodes can no longer leverage on the previous reputation information
gathered by other nodes and have to incur more time doing it themselves.
3.5 Unconventional Systems: Intrusion Detection
The field of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has been very well developed under the
traditional wired networks. However, as MANETs impose additional difficulties, the
effectiveness of solutions designed for wired networks pales when being applied directly
for the domain [47]. IDS can be classified based on the data collection mechanism, as
well as the event detection techniques. They may also be classified either as host-based
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or network based. Host-based IDS operates using the operating system’s audit trails,
system and application logs, or audit data generated by loadable-kernel modules that
intercept system calls. On the other hand, network-based IDS uses captured network
traffic data to make decisions.
There have been a few instances of applying traditional IDS techniques using dis-
tributed mechanisms [48, 49, 50, 51]. They follow a distributed yet cooperative approach.
The general working principle is as follows: Each node can be viewed as an indepen-
dent IDS but there exists inter-node collaborations so as to give a more accurate view
of the system state which serves to reduce the rate of false positives. On each node,
there are usually three kinds of modules: data collection, local detection and cooper-
ative detection. The traffic data collection module is responsible for monitoring local
neighboring traffic streams. The local detection engine module then analyzes the traces
gathered for evidence of anomalies. At this stage, the decision making process can either
be rule-based or signature-based (each has their own pros and cons). The last phase
employs distributed node cooperation in order reach a general consensus on certain de-
cisions based on statistical approaches. This step can help to drastically cut down on
the number of false positives triggered.
Another scheme [52] proposes a cross-feature analysis approach based on data mining
techniques to identify deviations caused by abnormal (or intrusive) routing activities.
The rational for this lies in the fact that strong feature correlation exists in normal
behavior patterns. Hence the likelihood of routing anomaly occurrences are high if any
abnormal activities are seen from the sea of normal routing patterns. So the framework
uses the anomaly detection models developed by the authors, which has been trained
using normal and abnormal routing traffic trace-logs, to observe for any unusual events.
If signs of anomalies are detected, an investigation alert is raised for possible routing
intrusions.
Recently, this field has seen the emergence of a new alternative approach that adopts
principles from the biological Human Immune System (HIS) [53, 54, 55] (refer to Figure
3.2). By modelling after the HIS, researchers have come up with an Artificial Immune
System (AIS) model. Although not all of the HIS features were incorporated into the
AIS (note that there are many aspects of the HIS that is still not fully understood),
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AIS for Mobile Ad-Hoc 3
The IS is thought to be able to classify cells that are present in the body as self and
non-self cells. The IS is made of two distinct sets of components: the innate IS, and
the adaptive IS. The innate IS is hard-wired to detect non self (and destroy) cells that
contain, or do not contain, specic patterns on their surface.
The adaptive IS is more complex. It produces a large number of randomly created
detectors. A negative selection mechanism eliminates detectors that match all cells
present in a protected environment (bone marrow and the thymus) where only self cells
are assumed to be present. Non-eliminated detectors become naive detectors; they
die after some time, unless they match something (assumed to be a pathogen), in which
case they become memory cells. Further, detectors that do match a pathogen are quickly
multiplied (clonal selection); this is used to accelerate the response to further attacks.
Also, since the clones are not exact replicates (they are mutated, the mutation rate being
an increasing function of afnity between detector and antigen) this provides a more
focused response to the pathogen (afnity maturation). This also provides adaptation
to a changing non-self environment.
The self-nonself model is only a very crude approximation of the adaptive IS. An-
other important aspect is the danger signal model [11, 12]. With this model, matching
by the innate or adaptive mechanism is not sufcient to cause detection; an additional
danger signal is required. The danger signal is for example generated by a cell that dies
before being old. The danger signal model better explains how the IS adapts not only to
a changing non-self, but also to some changes in self. There are many more aspects to























Fig. 1. From the natural IS to an AIS: Making DSR immune to node misbehavior.
1.4 Artificial Immune Systems - Related Work
Hofmeyer and Forrest uses an AIS for intrusion detection in wired local area networks
[5, 6]. Their work is based on the negative selection part of the self-nonself model and
some form of danger signal. TCP connections play the role of self and nonself cells. One
connection is represented by a triplet encoding sender’s destination address, receiver’s
destination address and receiver’s port number. A detector is a bit sequence of the same
Figure 3.2: Application of the Human Immune System to an Artificial Immune System.
preliminary r sults have hown that this inn vative approach holds grea p omise. AIS
uses the concept self and nonself to view the overall state of the network. The AIS is
made up of two distinct components: the innate IS and the adaptive IS. The innate IS is
hard-wired to detect nonself (and destroy) entities. The adaptive IS is more complex in
that they randomly generate detectors which then undergo ”negative selection” in order
to eliminate those matched self in the protected environment. In the earliest incarnation
of the mechanism, nodes learned before hand which types of network traffic are classified
as legitimate (self-type). They then proceed to monitor for any traffic streams that
deviate from the self-type they are aware of. Detectors that match nonself traffic are
further replicated in order to provide a more focused response. This can also accelerate
the response to further attacks.
The advantage of the AIS system is that it is able to evolve itself gradually based
on the kind of nonself entities it has come across using the detectors generated from the
negative selection mechanism. However, note that the self-nonself model is a very crude
approximation of the adaptive IS. A better model would be the inclusion of the ”danger
signal” mechanism. Under this model, matching by the innate or adaptive mechanism
is not sufficient to cause detection; an additional danger signal is required. The danger
signal better explains how the IS adapts not only to a changing nonself but also to
some changes in self since it is expected that the node’s self behavior will also change
over time. If not, the node’s future normal (self-type) traffic might also be classified as
non-self and thus trigger the detection system. Taking this into consideration, better
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solution proposals [56, 57] have been devised to incorporate this adaptiveness feature
into the system. Currently, the scope of AIS is only limited to the detection phase. The
main difficulty with this approach lies in how to accurately map, represent and port the
HIS concepts over to the AIS context. This holds the crucial key to extracting good
performance from mechanisms of this nature.
Chapter 4
METEOR Protocol Description
The MisbEhavior deTEctor and enfORcer (METEOR) protocol is based on our own
enhancement of the regular watchdog monitoring mechanism to be employed for node
misbehavior detection, coupled with blacklisting to keep the misbehaving nodes out
of the network. However, rather than using a form of reputation systems to decide
when to allow misbehaving nodes back into the network, we devise and use a simple
exclusion timing mechanism instead. This helps to avoid some major problems commonly
associated with reputation-based systems. At the end of the exclusion period, the selfish
node is granted network re-entry.
In addition, we also incorporate a simple learning mechanism: for every new detection
of selfish behavior committed by the same node after it is granted re-entry, that node’s
corresponding classification threshold value will be lowered and the exclusion timing
will be increased. We also devised a route assist feature to search for helper nodes
within a node’s neighborhood using the expanding ring search methodology in order to
route around a suspected downstream selfish node when packet droppings are repeatedly
observed at certain sections along the route.
In the following sections, we will first define the assumptions and terminologies used
by METEOR. We then do a complete protocol walk-through using examples to give
a detailed overview on how METEOR works. Finally, we provide the implementation
specifics of METEOR. We will present the functionalities of the various designed system
sub-components and the intercommunication relationships between them.
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4.1 Assumptions and Background
This subsection outlines the various METEOR assumptions we make regarding the prop-
erties of the physical and network layers of MANET as well as certain general node
behaviors.
4.1.1 Terminologies
The term neighbor is used to refer to a node that is within the wireless transmission range
of another node. Similarly, we refer to all nodes that are within the transmission range
of a node as being in the neighborhood. Being within the wireless transmission range in
our context here is defined as situated within a one-hop radius of the transmitting node.
A node that is currently monitoring another node is known as the observer while the
misbehaving node is termed the selfish node. A node being monitored but not classified
yet is called the observed node. A node that volunteers its service to route packets
around the selfish node along an existing path is called the helper.
4.1.2 Assumptions
For the design of METEOR, bidirectional communications symmetry is assumed on ev-
ery link between nodes. This assumption is considered to be valid since this is a working
requirement for many underlying wireless MAC layer protocols, including the most com-
monly used IEEE 802.11. In addition, we assume all nodes are capable of operating in
promiscuous mode. This means an observer can overhear other node communications
that are within range of itself; but however, transmission is limited to around a one-hop
range.
With regards to node behavior assumptions, we state that not all nodes are willing to
participate in providing network services to others. This means that there will always be
selfish nodes to some extent in any kind of scenarios. Misbehaving nodes will only display
pure selfish behavior. We also assume that malicious activities and other purposeful
intents to damage and disrupt the normal functioning of the network simply do not
exist.
We argue that in an open community setting, the scenario which we consider for ME-
50
TEOR, selfish node behavior will be more dominant as compared to malicious behavior
since the latter form requires a higher skill set which most normal users are unlikely
to possess. It is far more easier to behave selfishly than maliciously. Conversely, those
nodes that do not behave selfishly will exhibit helpful behavior i.e. they are willing to
contribute to the network whenever there is a need for them to do so. Finally, we can
assume all nodes to be pre-authenticated and no node can pretend to be another with-
out being exposed. Hence, we do not address the problem of node masquerading in our
protocol.
4.2 Protocol Walk-Through
In this section, we present a detailed overview of the important working principles of the
METEOR protocol. METEOR can be viewed loosely as subdivided into four different
phases: detection together with data aided-rerouting, exclusion and redemption.
Under the detection phase, the passive and active components are deployed. The
passive component is responsible for neighborhood monitoring while the active compo-
nent’s task is to seek out any HELPER nodes to perform local data re-routing upon
detecting malformed paths using information obtained from the passive component. In
the isolation phase, if any selfish node is detected and classified, all corresponding route
entries in the routing table containing the selfish node as the next hop will be set to false
and the selfish node is denied services by the observer for an exclusion period. Finally,
the redemption phase enables the network to allow selfish nodes with a second chance
back into the network.
4.2.1 Detection: Passive Monitoring
All nodes execute an initial local environment assessment phase known as the REQUEST-
FOR-PEERING-KNOWLEDGE phase. This is initiated when a node has just joined a
network. A selfish neighboring node upon receiving this packet will simply ignore this
request since it has no motivation to supply this information at the expense of its own
battery energy. Thereafter, this request is sent out on a periodic basis of every 7 seconds
to renew the table information.
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Internally, the nodes will maintain a table known as the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION
list which contains all the selfish nodes it has either learned through its neighbors or
based on its own observations. On entering a new region, a node broadcasts the PEER-
SELFISHNESS-REQUEST packets to its one-hop neighbors requesting for a list of their
own one-hop neighbors. By design, hop-based routing protocols such as AODV do not
possess any information beyond their next hop. This information gathering procedure
allows the nodes to build up their knowledge of neighboring nodes together with any
misbehaving nodes to within a two-hop radius for effective monitoring.
It enables the observer to know that the next hop is in fact sending a packet it has
forwarded to it, to another node which actually exists and not some fictitious node to
deceive the observer. Any selfish nodes that have already appeared on the SELFISH-
NODE-DECLARATION list of the node itself will be highlighted on the return list so
that the observer will be aware. This information will be processed to obtain any common
selfish nodes. Common nodes in between neighbors are obtained by comparing among
the retrieved lists. By METEOR definition, a node that appears in two or more lists
is a common selfish node. These nodes are then tagged as COMMON-MISBEHAVING
and recorded under the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list. As stated previously,
new requests are initiated periodically to renew the table information. Any selfish nodes
found under the new rounds are recorded down while the old ones are removed.
When this phase is over, the observer transits into the PASSIVE-NODE-MONITORING
phase. As the name suggests, we performed direct, passive observation of neighboring
network traffic. This is a technique commonly referred to as Passive Acknowledgment
(PACK). Every node in a MANET is responsible for ensuring that a packet sent out
is indeed received by the next-hop node. Passive acknowledgment is one simple means
of achieving this. Instead of waiting for an explicit acknowledgment of each packet by
the next-hop node on the route, a node assumes the correct reception of a packet when
it overhears the next-hop node forwarding the packet. Two conditions must be met in
order for PACK to function: (1). Nodes’ wireless interfaces are operating in promiscuous
mode and, (2). Network links are bidirectional. The sensing ranges for PACK are as
shown in Figure 4.1. Several misbehavior and detection systems proposed for MANETs





Figure 4.1: Sensing ranges for passive acknowledgment.
indeed effective under test-bed conditions in detecting different forms of attacks such as
packet dropping, modification and fabrication.
The basic operating principle of PACK is as follows. Due to the bi-directional nature
of the link-layer (IEEE 802.11), a node possessed the capability to find out whether
the next node forwards its packet if both nodes are still within sensing range of each
other provided promiscuous mode is enabled. If it does not overhear the packet being
forwarded, it either means that the next hop did not perform forwarding it or the packet
was forwarded but not overheard probably because the next-hop node has moved out of
range just after receiving the packet to be forwarded. Using the PACK retransmission
mechanism, the node waiting for the PACK resends the packet without waiting for the
ACK request if it detects packet dropping. When a new packet is received, it is con-
sidered a successful PACK if the following fields in the IP headers of the two packets
matched (as shown in Table 4.1):
The implementation of the PASSIVE-NODE-MONITORING phase is done by main-
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Fields
Source address Destination address
Protocol type Sequence-id number
Table 4.1: Fields in the IP Header to Match for a Successful PACK.
taining a buffer of recently sent packets in the observer and comparing each overheard
packet with the packets in the buffer to ascertain a match. Due to the fact that ME-
TEOR needs to perform packet retransmission at a later stage if necessary, there is a
need to uniquely identify each packet. If a match is confirmed, it means that the packet
has been successfully sent out by the next hop-node to the subsequent node along the
route. Hence the matched packet in the buffer will be removed. Otherwise, if the time-
out period is exceeded, the observer will then increment a tally belonging to the node
responsible for forwarding the packet. If the tally eventually exceeds a certain threshold
value, that selfish node is tagged as OBSERVATIONALLY-MISBEHAVING and added
to the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list.
4.2.2 Watchdog Enhancement
Although the neighborhood watchdog monitoring mechanism has proven to be effective,
it still suffers from a couple of serious drawbacks. The accuracy of the watchdog can
be compromised when there is a link breakage or due to changes in topological condi-
tions. As a result, the observer is unable to hear transmissions of the observed node at
a particular point in time (Figure 4.2 (i)). This may result in the observer incorrectly
identifying the observed node as misbehaving if the observed node had indeed forwarded
the data packet to the next node along the route. Thus in view of this problem and
to further improve upon the accuracy of the watchdog, we proposed a simple, straight
forward mechanism to aid in the decision making. As mentioned in the previous sub-
section, a buffer of recently sent data packets is maintained by METEOR. The buffer
serves the dual purpose for performing passive acknowledgment matching as well as for
retransmission of data packets.
In order to achieve that, the data packet is retained in the buffer for a slightly







Figure 4.2: The Watchdog mechanism: (i) Failure to observe a PACK. (ii) Sending of
FORWARDED packet back to the previous node.
by the observed, it will attempt data packet retransmissions for an additional couple
of times before increasing the misbehaving tally. On the other hand, if the observed
node receives a data packet which it has previously seen and has forwarded, it will
send a FORWARDED packet back to the observer (Figure 4.2 (ii)). Hence when the
observer receives a FORWARDED packet from the observed node, it will not increase
the misbehaving tally for the node and remove the corresponding data packet from
its buffer. This mechanism will be useful when the surrounding link conditions are
fluctuating momentarily or there is existent of severe radio interferences which is common
in wireless environments. Using this technique, we aim to further reduce the likelihood
of false detection and raise the accuracy of the watchdog.
4.2.3 Aided-Data-Rerouting: HELPER Nodes
Aided-Data-Rerouting is activated when a source node has sent data packets along a
particular routing path and experienced packet losses at some intermediate nodes. Under
normal functioning conditions, the assumption is that the next node will forward the
data packet to the next hop along the route. However data, route-request, route-reply
and error messages can be dropped silently by some intermediate selfish nodes along
the route making this kind of packet loss difficult to detect if explicit monitoring for
misbehavior is not in place initially.







Figure 4.3: Routing paths: (i) Normal path. (ii) Path that contains a selfish node.
will probably drop the packet since it wants to conserve its own battery power. As a
result, communications can break down silently at the section where the selfish node
resides and the original source node of the route has no way of knowing whether the
data packet did actually reach its final destination. However, with the observer node
being just one-hop away from the misbehaving node and installed with the watchdog
monitoring mechanism, it would be able to monitor for such networking anomalies.
Upon repeatedly encountering misbehavior at certain sections of a route, the observer
will then send out DISTRESS packets (Figure 4.4 (i)) to its surrounding neighbors in
an attempt to find HELPER nodes for bypassing the misbehaving node. Under the
HELPER node searching phase, METEOR adopts an expanding ring searching method-
ology. On the first round, the TTL value is set to one and if no suitable nodes are
found, the observer will then increase the TTL value to two (using the same packet-
ID) and perform another search. Hence the TTL value is increased incrementally till a
HELPER node is found. Any neighboring nodes that have seen the DISTRESS packets
with the same packet-ID previously will ignore them and forward to their subsequent
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next-hop neighbors and the same procedures repeat again. In this manner, unnecessary













Figure 4.4: Activation of the DISTRESS mechanism: (i) Sending of DISTRESS packets.
(ii) Return of DISTRESS-REPLY packets.
Any neighboring nodes that receive the DISTRESS packets will then perform an
assessment to determine their suitability to take on the HELPER node role. To be a
HELPER node, two criteria must be fulfilled: (1). The route cache of the HELPER node
must already contain an existing path to the destination node, and (2). The next-hop
node to the targeted destination must not be a selfish one. If these 2 conditions cannot
be met, DISTRESS-REPLY packets will not be send out. Conversely, upon fulfillment of
those conditions, nodes will then return a DISTRESS-REPLY packet back to the initial
originator node of the DISTRESS packets (Figure 4.4 (ii)). When all the DISTRESS-
REPLY packets are received, the observer then inspects the returned results and selects
the most suitable one to act as the HELPER node.
The selection of a suitable node among all the received entries is done using one





Figure 4.5: Sending RESULTS packets back to the original source node.
addition, if any HELPER node is found, the observer will set the next hop for that
original route to point to the HELPER node’s address. When this is completed, the
observer will then send out all the buffered packets via the new path. In addition, a
RESULTS packet (Figure 4.5) will also be sent to the original source node of the route
for the notification of resumption of data packets transmission to the destination node
if there exists any. In the worst case situation when totally no HELPER nodes can
be found, the observer will initiate a AODV RERR back to the original source node
of the route since this situation is equivalent to a pseudo link-breakage. It will discard
all previously buffered packets for this route as well. The source node of the route will
have to then re-initiate a new route discovery according to the normal AODV operating
specifications.
4.2.4 Exclusion and Redemption: Heuristic
The node redemption procedure allows nodes that have been added to the SELFISH-
NODE-DECLARATION list back into the network if they change their behavior. When
a selfish node is tagged, an exclusion timer is computed in order to deny the exchange
of bidirectional services for the selfish node. The timing, Texclusion, is computed using
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the following equation:
Texclusion = N × T (4.2.1)
N is known as the deny factor and T is the basic deny time unit. T is taken to be
twice the value of an AODV hello-message interval which is 1000 ms. The deny factor,
N, is then calculated using the next equation:
N = log(wp) (4.2.2)
wp is known as the power unit derived from the following equation:
wp = αβ+δ (4.2.3)
The various definitions of the terms in Equation 4.2.3 are as follows: α is the total
number of good neighbors known by the observer. This value is computed to be one less
the total number of current neighbors of the observer since the misbehaving node is not
taken into account. β is a fixed value corresponding to the number of allowed attempts on
data re-transmissions to the next-hop node before the DISTRESS mechanism is initiated
for that particular data-stream session. Finally, δ is the recorded number of times
the observed has been classified as misbehaving while still remaining in the observer’s
neighborhood.
Hence, the service exclusion timing is a parameter computed based on existing real
time situational factors such as the current number of neighbors as well as the recorded
number of misbehaving attempts of the selfish node. The rational for this is that the
number of neighbors directly determines the local connectivity of the observer. If there
are few nodes in the observer’s neighborhood, it would not make much sense to isolate the
selfish node for too long and thus affecting its own connectivity to the rest of the network.
In addition, by taking into account the recorded frequency of misbehaving attempts of
the selfish node, a heavier punishment is imposed on nodes which are unrepentant. The
net result is that those nodes will be isolated for a longer period.
When the service denial timing has been calculated, the observer then excludes ser-
vices to the selfish node till the end of the exclusion period. In addition, the observer
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Figure 4.6: Sending of pLink-Loss packets to a selfish node by its neighbors.
will also activate the pLINK-LOSS mechanism (refer to Figure 4.6). The mechanism
involves deactivating all route entries under its routing table with the selfish node as the
next hop and notifying the selfish node via a special information packet. This exclusion
time is unknown to the rouge node. At the end of the exclusion period, the observer
then lifts the imposed punishment.
If the selfish node is still in the routing table of the observer, all routes that have
the selfish node as the next hop will be re-activated. The selfish node’s status under
the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list is then revoked and allowed back into the
network. If the selfish node is still in the observer’s neighborhood, it will not be deleted
from the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list in case the selfish node misbehaves
again.
In additional, with each subsequent node redemption, the selfishness classification
threshold factor also decreases with each subsequent new round it is found to be misbe-
having. A uniform distribution is used to generate the number of observing attempts.
The upper bound, Bupper, of the uniform distribution is calculated using the equation:
Bupper =Mobserv − 2δ (4.2.4)
Mobserv is a fixed pre-defined value and δ is similar from the earlier definition: it is the
recorded number of times a selfish node has been classified as misbehaving while still in
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the observer’s neighborhood. This means that for each new classification of misbehavior,
a selfish node upon redemption will be more easily classified as being selfish and suffers
a longer exclusion period if it misbehaves again. Thus with this method, selfish nodes
are allowed back into the network if they revert back to good behavior but similarly,
they will be penalized more heavily if they are found to be unrepentant.
4.2.5 Locality Self-Awareness for Selfish Nodes
When a node starts to behave selfishly, it will be isolated by its surrounding neighboring
nodes. However, the surrounding nodes will send pLINK-LOSS packets to inform the
selfish nodes before taking punishment actions rather than quietly isolating it. This
enables selfish nodes to be more aware of their surrounding connectivity status to decide
whether to continue their wayward behavior. If a node is not repentant, it risks being
totally isolated from the network at its current position.
In METEOR, selfish nodes undertake the following actions to ascertain whether
they should continue their behavior. Each selfish node maintains a locality awareness
table which records how many pLINK-LOSS messages it has received so far from its
surrounding neighbors. This table is only useful when a node is misbehaving. Let
Wneighbrs be the total number of neighbors for the selfish node (i.e. obtained from the
neighbor connectivity table) and Drecv be the number of neighbors out of Wneighbrs
which the selfish node has already received pLINK-LOSS messages from. Hence, the
proportion ratio of nodes, θdiscr, currently denying services to the selfish node is then





If θdiscr exceeds a threshold, λthreshold, a value determine by the selfish node itself, it
will then revert back to good behavior since the possibility of it being isolated from the
network is getting increasingly higher. This parameter varies from node to node since
the exclusion tolerance level for every node is different. From the node perspective, θdiscr
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can be viewed as the instantaneous selfishness level the selfish node is willing to display
and λthreshold as the extent of selfishness the selfish node is willing to display. Hence
the higher the value of λthreshold, the poorer the predicted performance of the network
will get since the selfish nodes are likely to continue misbehaving for a given number of
neighbors.
When this feature is implemented and employed by the selfish nodes, it becomes
difficult to predict the absolute number of selfish nodes in the population at any one time
since the actual performance of this feature will be heavily influenced by the mobility
pattern. Thus in this thesis, investigation of this feature is omitted since we want the
proportion of selfish nodes to remain constant for the entire simulation duration. We
will leave this for future work.
4.3 Protocol Components
The tasks which METEOR carries out chiefly comprise of detection, helping to re-route
possible dropped data packets, exclusion and redemption of selfish nodes. Each node
performs all the tasks independently of other nodes.
METEOR consists of several components for the fulfillment of these tasks. The
architecture shown in Figure 4.7 is modular and each single component can be customized
for different applications or environments. The four main METEOR components are:
the Packet Behavior Tracker (PBT), the Node Behavior Asserter (NBA), the Route
Manager (RM) and the Message Signal Coordinator (MSC). The components presented
here are designed for coping with routing and forwarding misbehavior for MANET nodes
running on AODV. The functionalities of each component are as described below.
4.3.1 Packet Behavior Tracker
The main responsibility of the Packet Behavior Tracker (PBT) is to monitor for any
traffic anomalies passing by a node’s vicinity. In a wireless networking environment,
the nodes most likely to detect non-compliant networking behavior are those in the
vicinity of the misbehaving nodes. Hence intuitively, one solution is to implement a
component within each individual node to monitor for signs of misbehavior locally. From
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Figure 4.7: METEOR Components.
another perspective, this per node solution is also more scalable. Each observer loaded
with the PBT module can detect deviations by the next node either by listening to the
transmission of the next node or by observing route protocol behavior.
Upon startup, the PBTmodule is tasked to carry out the REQUEST-FOR-PEERING-
KNOWLEDGE phase which is to retrieve the list of one-hop neighbors surrounding their
immediate one-hop neighbors in order to empower the observer with the two-hop radius
knowledge around them. In addition, the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list that
records selfish nodes around a node will also be inserted into the return list. The observer
will then tag those marked selfish nodes as COMMON-MISBEHAVING and record them
under its own SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list.
The PBT then switches to the main operating mode known as the PASSIVE-NODE-
MONITORING phase. Under this phase, the PBT will primarily monitor the traffic
of its neighbors to check if they have indeed transmitted any packets to the next node
which the observer has sent to them. Upon detection of any misbehavior, the PBT
triggers a counter update for this node and checks if the threshold has been exceeded.
If the threshold is exceeded, the selfish node is then marked as OBSERVATIONALLY-
MISBEHAVING. If not, the observer continues monitoring till the threshold is reached or
the observed has moved away from its neighborhood. In addition, the PBT is responsible
for the computation of a new classification threshold value for a previously selfish node
after it has been redeemed at the end of the exclusion period.
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4.3.2 Node Behavior Asserter
The task of the Node-Behavior-Asserter (NBA) is to record all the highlighted self-
ish nodes into the list. From the PBT, if a node is deemed to be both COMMON-
MISBEHAVING and OBSERVATIONALLY-MISBEHAVING, the PBT calls up the
NBA module which will then record the selfish nodes under the SELFISH-NODE-
DECLARATION list.
The observer will notify the selfish node by sending out a pLINK-LOSS packet.
Control is then passed over to the Route Manager (RM) for the next course of action to
be taken. In addition, the NBA also calculates and activates the exclusion period. At
the end of the exclusion period, the node is allowed back into the network.
Finally, the NBA is also responsible for assessing whether a local node is suitable to
act as a HELPER node when the Message Signal Coordinator (MSC) has passed control
over upon receipt of the DISTRESS packet. The NBA then calls the MSC to send out
a DISTRESS-REPLY packet back to the node that originated the DISTRESS packet.
4.3.3 Route Manager
The Route Manager (RM) acts as an overall route controller to manage the route entries
using information from the routing table as well as the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION
table. Any next-hop path which points to the selfish nodes will be inactivated. In other
words, bidirectional service exchanges for those selfish nodes will be denied till the end
of the exclusion period.
For a new route discovery, based on the one-hop results obtained, the RM will not
choose any next-hop node enroute to the intended destination that is deemed as selfish.
This ensures that by avoiding misbehaving nodes, only clean routes are formed during
the route searching phase to achieve better network performance.
4.3.4 Message Signal Coordinator
The Message Signal Coordinator (MSC) is primarily responsible for the receipt and
sending of special METEOR packets. If an intermediate node along a route has detected
misbehavior repeatedly on the immediate downstream node, it will try to search for
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new HELPER nodes to bypass the suspected misbehaving node. This is achieved via
the expanding ring searching technique using the DISTRESS and DISTRESS-REPLY
packets. If new helper nodes can be found, all the buffered packets for that stream will
then be retransmitted via the new route. If not, they will be deleted instead.
If in the midst of the searching process, a new route to the destination has been
formed by AODV, the current search effort will be terminated and the buffered packets
are sent through the new route instead. However, when no alternative paths to the
original destination are obtained after searching through the entire neighborhood, an
AODV-RERR is initiated since this situation is akin to a link-breakage, albeit a pseudo
one. The source node of the route then re-initiates a new route discovery using the normal
AODV procedures. This mechanism is only activated on detection of misbehavior and
not for AODV link-breakages.
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4.4 Finite State Machine
The various interactions between the four different components as described in the pre-
vious sections are as shown in Figure 4.8. This particular implementation was intention-
ally designed to make use of certain AODV features in order to function more effectively.
However, these can be easily modified to accommodate any type of underlying MANET
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Figure 4.8: METEOR Architecture and Finite State Machine Within Each Node.
In addition, METEOR uses seven unique types of customized packets, with a common
packet header, for proper functioning and communication at the respective phases. For
more details on the definitions of the packet formats, please refer to Appendix A located
at the end of this thesis.
Chapter 5
Performance Analysis
In order to assess how well METEOR performs, we conduct simulations under the Glo-
MoSim platform. We devised various scenarios and subject METEOR to the different
evaluation tests. In the following sections, we will define the parameters used for the
experiments. We then present the results, followed with detailed discussions for each
scenario.
5.1 GloMoSim Simulation with AODV
5.1.1 Goals and Metrics
The objective of this performance analysis is to determine the impact of the METEOR
protocol extensions on the different metrics described below in a MANET setting where
a part of the population misbehaves. The regular AODV protocol is used as our refer-
ence on top which METEOR is built on. Our goal is also to learn how certain protocol
parameters such as thresholds should be set. The following metrics are considered.
Throughput, Dropped Packets. The first metric under investigation is the resulting
total goodput G of a network with n nodes, i.e. the amount of data packets that are
successfully forwarded to the correct intended destination. Goodput is one of the main








Receivedi denotes a packet successfully received by the intended destination node.
Originatedi denotes a packet that is sent out by a predefined source node. As opposed
to the throughput, goodput has already factored packet loss and retransmission into ac-
count. The goodput is directly influenced by packet losses. For MANET systems, packet
losses can be attributed to various factors such as link failures or unreachable nodes due
to mobility. However, packet losses can also occur if they happen to pass through some
misbehaving intermediate nodes which intentionally drops them. The latter is the only
form of packet losses directly held to misbehavior. For completeness, we will therefore
include the number of intentionally dropped packets as another additional metric.
Overhead. We look at the overheads caused by the extra METEOR messages transmit-
ted since the cost of internal computation in terms of energy consumption is negligible
as compared to the cost of transmissions. They are measured by the various extra con-
trol messages transmitted during the process. METEOR control messages comprises of
the following types: PEER-SELFISHNESS-REQUEST, PEER-SELFISHNESS-REPLY,
DISTRESS, DISTRESS-REPLY, PLINK-LOSS, RESULTS and FORWARDED packets.
In the case of AODV, control messages are measured via a combination of the follow-
ing: ROUTE-REQUEST, ROUTE-REPLY, REPLY-ACKS and ROUTE-ERROR. The
resulting total overheads incurred is then expressed as a ratio of the total overheads for
both METEOR and AODV.
True and False Positives. True positives is defined as when a misbehaving node has
been successfully identified as one by another regular node while false positives is defined
as when a node wrongly classifies another node as misbehaving. True and false positives
are measured at the end of the simulation.
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5.1.2 Simulation Setup
For performance analysis of the protocol extensions, the metrics are measured under
various types of network scenarios. The protocols employed in the investigations are
normal AODV and METEOR-enhanced AODV. The first network we analyze is a normal
well-behaved AODV network which is then used as a reference comparison.
We then introduce misbehaving nodes. These misbehaving nodes do not forward any
messages for other nodes. The messages here refer to only data packets. Contrary to
logic, it is actually more beneficial for misbehaving nodes to forward protocol control
packets such as RREQ and RREP at the expense of increased energy consumption as
it will allow them to gain knowledge of routes to various destinations. The next type of
network used for the analysis is one filled with a fraction of misbehaving nodes but not
fortified with any defensive mechanisms.
Then we use a version of AODV enhanced with the METEOR add-on protocol.
We refer to it as the fortified version. The first enhancement for a fortified network is
the addition of the watchdog to monitor the forwarding behavior of the next-hop node.
The second enhancement in a fortified network is the adoption of selfish node isolation
actions based on a node’s own observations. If a node repeatedly observed that its
next-hop neighbor refused to forward data packets, it will buffer the packet and retry
for a number of times before giving up and attempts to search for a HELPER node
within its neighborhood in order to route the dropped data packets to their intended
destination. The third enhancement is to isolate nodes that have already exceeded the
selfish classification threshold for an exclusion period and re-allow them back into the
network at the end of the period.
Out of the possible variety of routing and forwarding attacks that can be performed on
AODV, we focus efforts on the examination of forwarding detection for this performance
analysis, because its impact on the network performance can be measured directly.
The simulations are implemented on GloMoSim [59], a network simulator for mobile
ad hoc networks. Unless otherwise specified, the experiments were repeated ten times
with varying random seeds. The seed influences the placement and movement of the
nodes via the mobility model.
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5.1.3 Factors and Parameters
The fixed parameters for the simulations are listed in Table 5.1. The radio range, sending
capacity and MAC have been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf device. The mobility
model chosen is the Random Waypoint Model, in which nodes move to a random desti-
nation at a speed uniformly distributed between 0 m/s and a specified maximum speed.
Once they reached their intended destination, they stay there for a period as specified in
the pause time parameter. The rational for this movement behavior is to have a random
movement with pauses in between with the aim to reflect realistic user behavior.
Parameter Level
Area 2000 m x 2000 m
Speed Uniformly distributed between 0 ∼ 15 m/s
Node Placement Random
Movement Algorithm Random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Transmission Bitrate / Range 2 Mbps / 250 m
Traffic Source Type CBR
Packet Size / Rate 512 bytes / 3600 pkts/sec
Packet Interarrival Time 0.25 s
Passive Ack Period 100 ms
Simulation Time 900 s
Number of Nodes 60
Table 5.1: Fixed Simulation Parameters.
The speed is chosen to be uniformly distributed between 0 to 15 m/s to simulate
a range of users that are either stationary or walking. For the same reason, we use
random placement in order to more closely mimic real world conditions. The chosen
area approximately mirrors the dimension of a typical town. The simulation time is
chosen to be long enough to allow nodes to potentially roam the entire area. Finally,
CBR has been chosen as the traffic type (refer to as application-based traffic) in order
to avoid the peculiarities of more complicated protocols such as TCP or UDP. The
70
application traffic is defined as follows. A server constantly sends data to a client which
in turn responses to the server. For the servers selection, we only choose nodes that are
not misbehaving in nature since METEOR works by ignoring traffic when they are found
to be misbehaving by regular nodes; misbehaving nodes cannot act as servers. As for the
clients, they are generated randomly for the simulations. We vary a few factors for the
simulations: the total number of nodes in the network, the percentage of misbehaving
nodes, the pause time, the number of applications and the mobility speed.
5.2 Simulation Results
5.2.1 Throughput Measurement
5.2.1.1 Throughput vs Varying Pause Time: Scenario 1
Under this scenario setup, similar to the previous scenarios, misbehaving nodes will drop
the data packets they are supposed to forward for others. Hence, this will have a direct
impact on the overall network throughput. Figure 5.1 shows the successful throughput
results for a fixed network where we vary the mobility pause time. We compared the
performance of defenseless AODV versus METEOR-fortified AODV. Table 5.2 shows
the variable parameters used for this set of simulation run.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.2: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 1.
As seen from Figure 5.1, plain AODV without the presence of any selfish nodes
achieves the best performance while defenseless AODV achieves the worst performance
of the lot. METEOR lies somewhere in between the two of them, achieving moderate
performance. This is an improvement over the defenseless AODV case.
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Figure 5.1: Throughput vs Varying Pause Time.
METEOR’s poorer performance as compared to normal AODV’s performance can
be attributed to two reasons. The first is because the watchdog mechanism is not perfect
and has various drawbacks. Thus, not all misbehaving nodes are detected and classified.
This problem has already been noted in the literature. The second reason is because
of the various overheads created by METEOR resulting in more re-transmissions and
bandwidth usage. Despite these reasons, METEOR is still able to show a significant
improvement over the defenseless AODV due to the data-aided re-routing scheme. The
mechanism provides a second chance for packets that have been or will be dropped by
any potential misbehaving nodes.
5.2.1.2 Throughput vs Varying Proportion of Misbehaving Nodes: Scenario
2
For this scenario setup, we observe the network throughput obtained when the propor-
tion of misbehaving nodes in the entire node population is varied. Figure 5.2 shows
the network throughput under a constant network size where we vary the proportion of
misbehaving nodes present. We compared the performance of defenseless AODV versus




Pause Time 300 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 15
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 10% ∼ 70 %
Table 5.3: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 2.
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Figure 5.2: Throughput vs Varying Proportion of Misbehaving Nodes.
From Figure 5.2, it is apparent that METEOR is able to provide a higher level of
throughput compared to defenseless AODV when the proportion of selfish nodes in the
total node population is gradually increased. However, we see that the gap between the
curves narrows progressively as the proportion of selfish nodes increases. This observa-
tion is consistent with the results we obtained earlier. As the proportion of selfish nodes
approaches the total node population, more data packets are being dropped and hence
it becomes more difficult for METEOR to find any available HELPER nodes to re-route
the dropped data packets.
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5.2.2 Dropped Data Packets Measurement
5.2.2.1 Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying
Pause Time: Scenario 3
In this scenario, we measure the number of packets dropped intentionally by intermediate
misbehaving nodes as packets pass though them. The misbehavior works by dropping
data packets they are supposed to forward for others in order to conserve energy. Fig-
ure 5.3 shows the mean number of packets dropped intentionally by selfish nodes versus
varying pause time. We compared the performance of regular AODV without defense
against METEOR-fortified AODV. We also perform cross comparisons between the two
different versions of AODV for node population sizes of 40 and 60. Table 5.4 shows
the parameters adjusted for this simulation run while the rest of other main simulation
parameters are as tabulated in Table 5.1.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 40 & 60
Number of CBR sources 15
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.4: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 3.
From Figure 5.3, we see that for either node population sizes, the METEOR-fortified
AODV is able to reduce the number of intentionally dropped data packets by misbe-
having nodes as compared to the regular defenseless AODV. This can be attributed to
METEOR’s detection and avoidance capability on observation of any potential misbe-
having nodes.
We also observed that the increase in total node population sizes has a dramatic effect
on the gap difference between the two versions of AODV. The explanation is that when
there are more nodes around in a predefined space, METEOR has access to a greater
number of nodes that are not selfish in nature. Thus it has a higher probability of finding
alternative routes to the same destination node via other neighboring nodes to bypass
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Figure 5.3: Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying Pause
Time.
suspected misbehaving nodes as compared to the case of a smaller node population.
5.2.2.2 Proportion of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying Pause
Time: Scenario 4
In this scenario, we measure the ratio, R, the number of intentionally dropped data
packets by intermediate misbehaving nodes to the total number of total packets sent by
predefined server nodes.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.5: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 4.
The misbehavior pattern follows that as in scenario 1. Figure 5.4 shows the plot of
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this ratio, R, versus varying pause time. We compared the performance of defenseless
AODV versus a version of AODV fortified with METEOR. Table 5.5 displays the variable
parameters used for this simulation run.
From Figure 5.4, we observed that in the case of defenseless AODV, the ratio R
consistently runs near to the 0.6 mark while for METEOR, it averages about 0.3 which
is 2 folds lower. Thus METEOR is able to achieve a significantly lower intentionally
dropped data packet ratio as compared to regular defenseless AODV. The lower dropping
rate shows that in general, METEOR is able to effectively prevent data packets from
being routed through misbehaving nodes.
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Figure 5.4: Proportion of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying Pause Time.
5.2.2.3 Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying
Proportion of Misbehaving Nodes: Scenario 5
In this scenario setup, we measure the number of dropped data packets in a fixed network
population when the proportion of misbehaving nodes are gradually increased. Figure
5.5 shows the mean number of intentionally packets dropped by selfish nodes versus
varying proportion of selfish nodes in a fix network size. We compared the performance
of defenseless AODV versus METEOR-fortified AODV . Table 5.6 shows the variable
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parameters used for this set of simulation run.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 30 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 10 ∼ 80 %
Table 5.6: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 5.
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Figure 5.5: Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying Proportion
of Misbehaving Nodes.
As observed from Figure 5.5, the results are within expectations whereby as the
proportion of selfish nodes in a network increases, the amount of dropped data packets
increases correspondingly. However, although the amount of dropped data packets did
increase for METEOR’s case, the overall amount per se is approximately 2.5 times lower
than that of defenseless AODV. This demonstrates that METEOR’s countermeasures
are working effectively.
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5.2.2.4 Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying
Node Population: Scenario 6
In this scenario, we investigate the number of packets dropped intentionally when we
increase the number of nodes. Figure 5.6 shows the mean number of packets dropped
intentionally versus varying node population. We compared the performance of defense-
less AODV versus METEOR-fortified AODV. Table 5.7 shows the variable parameters
used for this simulation run.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 300 s
Number of nodes 40 ∼ 100
Number of CBR sources 15
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.7: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 6.






































Figure 5.6: Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying Node
Population.
From Figure 5.6, as expected, the mean number of packets dropped is observed to
increase with a larger node population. The reason is that there are more misbehav-
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ing nodes with a larger node population thus resulting in more dropped data packets.
Initially the rate of increase for both METEOR and defenseless AODV are quite close.
However, the curve gap starts to widen as the number of nodes reaches 60 with METEOR
being the one giving the better performance as we progress upwards. Overall METEOR
manages to achieve a much lower packet dropping rate as compared to defenseless AODV
even when we increased the number of nodes.
An interesting observation to be pointed out is that for both defenseless AODV and
METEOR, the number of intentionally dropped packets starts to reach a plateau state
when the total node population hits 70 and beyond. One possible explanation is that the
number of selfish nodes has attained a threshold value for the majority of the commonly
used routes to be poisoned with selfish nodes. Note that the simulation area remains
unchanged. Thus the quantity of packets that can possibly be discarded by selfish nodes
approaches a maximum since the majority of the traffic routes are already infiltrated
by selfish nodes. Consequently, we observe the merit of METEOR over normal AODV
under this situation. As a result of the countermeasures implemented in METEOR, the
amount of intentionally dropped packets is significantly lowered under such a scenario.
5.2.3 Classification Ratio Measurement
5.2.3.1 Classification Ratio vs Varying Pause Time: Scenario 7
For this scenario, we measure the nodes classification ratio of the watchdog mechanism
deployed in METEOR, enhanced using our simple FORWARDED scheme. The watchdog
mechanism has been widely used by many other mitigation protocols of the same nature.
We compute two kinds of classification ratios: true and false positives. The definitions of
these two ratios follow that as stated at the start of this section. The true classification












Selfishi is a selfish node that has been successfully identified. In contrast, Regulari
is a regular node that has been identified as selfish at the end of the simulation. Lastly,
Totali is the total number of predefined selfish nodes used for this scenario set. We com-
pare between the different versions of these two set of results. The first one measures the
performance (both true and false ratio) of the normal watchdog mechanism. The second
one measures the performance (both true and false ratio) of the watchdog mechanism
that has been enhanced using our scheme. Figure 5.7 shows the average classification
ratio versus varying pause time. Table 5.8 shows the variable parameters used for this
set of experiment.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 30
Number of CBR sources 15
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.8: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 7.
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Figure 5.7: Classification Ratio vs Varying Pause Time.
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From Figure 5.7, we see that the true classification ratio of both schemes are on
par; both are well below that of the false classification ratio. This result is somewhat
expected due to the unreliability as suffered by the normal watchdog mechanism [44].
It is also influenced by the mobility pattern employed. However for the false classifica-
tion ratio, we see that our scheme performs very much better compared to the normal
watchdog mechanism. By using the FORWARDED packet sending scheme to inform the
upstream node whenever a downstream node sees a packet it has previously forwarded
to the next-hop node, we have dramatically reduced the rate of false classification while
maintaining the true classification ratio at the same level.
5.2.4 Broken Links Measurement
5.2.4.1 Number of Broken Links vs Varying Pause Time: Scenario 8
In this particular scenario, we observe the number of broken links incurred by the re-
spective protocols. We compared between the three versions of AODV: plain, defenseless
and, METEOR-fortified. Figure 5.8 shows the number of broken links as measured in
the network versus varying pause time. Table 5.9 shows the variable parameters used
for this set of simulation run.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.9: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 8.
From Figure 5.8, we observed that the number of broken links suffered by the net-
work decreases when the pause time is increased. This falls within expectations since
increasing pause time implies that the network is becoming less mobile leading to lesser
link breakages. The main important observation is that plain AODV incurs the greatest
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Figure 5.8: Number of Broken Links vs Varying Pause Time.
amount of broken links, followed by defenseless AODV and lastly METEOR-fortified
AODV. While AODV suffers normal rate of link breakages under the presence of mobil-
ity, METEOR-fortified AODV suffers a significantly lesser amount due to the fact that
METEOR does not form routes in which the next hop-node is deemed to be selfish by
that local node in concern. Thus, the number of routes formed under METEOR-fortified
AODV scheme could substantially be much lower than that formed by regular AODV
leading to lesser link breakages being observed overall.
5.2.5 Overheads Measurement
5.2.5.1 Overheads Ratio vs Varying Pause Time: Scenario 9
In this experiment, we measure the overheads generated by METEOR calculated over










METEOR.OV ERHEADSi is an overhead packet generated by METEOR. Corre-
spondingly, AODV.OV ERHEADSi is then an overhead packet generated by normal
AODV. Figure 5.9 shows the overhead ratio versus varying pause time. The number of
nodes are fixed but we carried out the investigations for three different mobility speed.
Table 5.10 shows the adjustable parameters used for this set of experiment.
Parameter Level
Mobility Speed 5 ∼ 15 m/s
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.10: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 9.
We note from Figure 5.9, the average overhead ratio hovers around the range of 0.4
- 0.5. As observed, the increase in mobility does not result in overheads increasing dra-
matically but rather a slight decrease. This is due to the fact that when nodes moved
faster, the watchdog mechanism does not have ample opportunities to ascertain the mis-
behaving status of a suspected node. Thus, the HELPER node finding mechanism does
not have a chance to be activated as often as compared to the slower moving scenario
case, hence causing a slight drop in the overheads.
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Figure 5.9: Overheads Ratio vs Varying Pause Time.
5.2.6 Effects of FORWARDED mechanism Measurement
5.2.6.1 Throughput vs Varying Pause Time: Scenario 10
For this scenario, we investigate the overall throughput obtained when the watchdog
FORWARDED mechanism was enabled and disabled. The defenseless AODV result was
used as a base reference. Figure 5.10 shows the throughput obtained when the FOR-
WARDED mechanism is enabled and disabled versus varying pause time. Table 5.11
shows the set of variable parameters employed for this scenario.
Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 30
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.11: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 10.
From Figure 5.10, we see that the throughput obtained when the FORWARDED
mechanism is enabled gave the best result among all three curves. When the FOR-
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WARDED mechanism was disabled, the throughput performance drops drastically. At
times, it even closely approaches the performance level of the defenseless AODV case.
Thus from this set of result, we observe that the problem of false classification can es-
calate to a serious issue if it is not properly arrested. Hence with the inclusion of the
FORWARDED scheme in the watchdog mechanism, METEOR can help to prevent this
problem from going out of hand and contribute to better overall network performance.
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Figure 5.10: Throughput vs Varying Pause Time.
5.2.6.2 Mean Number of Intentionally Dropped Data Packets vs Varying
Pause Time: Scenario 11
In this particular scenario, we seek to find out the amount of intentionally dropped data
packets under the effects of the FORWARDED scheme used for METEOR’s watchdog
mechanism. Figure 5.11 shows the mean number of intentionally dropped data packets
when the FORWARDED mechanism is enabled and disabled versus varying pause time.
Table 5.12 shows the set of variable parameters used for this scenario.
From Figure 5.11, we see that when the FORWARDED mechanism was switched
off, the curve gave a lower volume of intentionally dropped data packets as compared
to when the mechanism was enabled. With the mechanism disabled, the probability of
more nodes being wrongly classified as selfish increases as demonstrated by the earlier
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Parameter Level
Pause Time 0 ∼ 700 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of CBR sources 15
Ratio of Misbehaving Nodes 30 %
Table 5.12: Varying Parameters Used For Scenario 11.
results. This in turn lowers the finding probability of a successful route to the required
destination. Consequently, lesser routes can be formed and decreases the chances of
data packets being transmitted out eventually and thus transiting through both regular
and selfish nodes. This is why the throughput and the quantity of dropped packets are
observed to be much lower as compared to the case when the mechanism is turned on.
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In this work, we have proposed, presented and evaluated a misbehavior mitigation pro-
tocol known as METEOR for helping MANET routing protocols cope with misbehaving
nodes.
METEOR was specially designed for hop-based routing protocols such as AODV
unlike current schemes which targets source-based protocols such as DSR. For detection
of misbehaving nodes, we adopt a widely used mechanism known as the watchdog scheme.
We enhanced it further with our simple add-on feature known as the FORWARDED
mechanism to better aid in the classification of misbehaving nodes by the watchdog. We
demonstrated that for regular AODV running with the normal watchdog mechanism,
the false classification ratio is very much higher as compared to that of the watchdog
mechanism enhanced using our scheme. At the same time, we are able to maintain the
true classification ratio at the same level for both types of schemes.
We also introduced an alternative route-assist scheme which works at the METEOR
level. This scheme helps to search for HELPER nodes along other paths which are willing
to act as the next forwarding node to the original destination node whenever repeated
packet dropping is observed to occur at the next-hop node along the current path. We
have demonstrated that with our scheme, we are able to improve the overall goodput as




Finally, we also presented a node isolation and redemption scheme. The node iso-
lation computation scheme takes into account the current number of neighbors and the
recorded number of times a selfish node has misbehaved. For the redemption scheme,
we allow a selfish node back into the network when the exclusion period has expired.
With regards to the number of intentionally dropped data packets, the relevant set of
simulation results have demonstrated that our protocol is able to lower the value of this
metric as compared to defenseless AODV investigated under different types of parame-
ters such as total node population, varying pause time and selfish node proportion. All
these were accomplished yet incurring comparable level of protocol overheads.
6.2 Future Work
We have shown the working and implementation details of METEOR for MANETs
running on top of a hop-based routing protocol such as AODV. For future work, we would
like to extend the application of METEOR to other routing protocols and domains. We
are also interested in expanding the range of observed node misbehavior to other more
sophisticated forms of malicious attacks such as masquerading or packet modifications.
Another area we are immensely interested in is the issue of performing node load
balancing for the remaining good nodes in the presence of bad nodes when they be-
ing burdened with extra traffic loads. Finally, we want to investigate means to further
improve upon the true classification rate of the watchdog mechanism. In addition, an-
other potential improvement is the incorporation of self-learning detection mechanisms
to adaptively counter new forms of misbehavior on the fly in a manner similar to how
the human immune system reacts against foreign pathogen.
Appendix A
METEOR Packet Formats
The different types of specialize packet formats utilized by METEOR are as shown below.
1. Common METEOR Packet Options Header
METEOR ID Payload Length
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Options
Reserved
Figure A.1: Packet format for METEOR Options Header.
1. METEOR ID : 8-bit unsigned integer ID to identify packets belonging to the
METEOR protocol.
2. Payload Length : 16-bit unsigned integer. The length of the METEOR Options
header excluding the 4-octet fixed portion. The value of this field indicates the
total length of all options carried in the METEOR Options header.




4. Options: A variable length field. The length of this field is specified by the
Payload Length field in this METEOR Options header. It contains one or more
pieces of optional information (METEOR Options) which is encoded in the type-
length-value (TLV) format.
2. The PEER-SELFISHNESS-REQUEST Packet
Host Source Address
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Target Destination Address
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data Len
Figure A.2: Packet format for PEER-SELFISHNESS-REQUEST packet.
1. Option Type : 8-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
3. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. A unique value is generated by the orig-
inal sender of the packet. A new value is used for each new request.
4. Host Source Address: MUST be set to the address of the node originating this
packet.
5. Target Destination Address: The address of the node from which the host
source node wish to obtain the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list.
3. The PEER-SELFISHNESS-REPLY Packet
1. Option Type : 8-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
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Host Source Address
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Target Destination Address
Returned Selfish Address [1]
...
Returned Selfish Address [2]
Returned Selfish Address [n]
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data Len
Figure A.3: Packet format for the PEER-SELFISHNESS-REPLY packet.
2. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
3. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. A unique value is generated by the orig-
inal sender of the packet. A new value is used for each new request.
4. Host Source Address: MUST be set to the address of the node originating this
packet.
5. Target Destination Address: The address of the node from which the PEER-
SELFISHNESS-REQUEST packet was received from. This field is copied from the
Host Source Address field of the PEER-SELFISHNESS-REQUEST packet.
6. Returned Selfish Address [1. . . n] : Address [i] is the address of the selfish node
which is stored in the SELFISH-NODE-DECLARATION list of the Host Source
Address node. The number of addresses present in this field is calculated by using
the value in Opt Data Len. (n = (Opt Data Len - 10) / 4). Each new address
adds 4 octets to the Opt Data Len value.
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Discriminating Source Address
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Discriminated Target Destination  Address
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data Len
Figure A.4: Packet format for the pLINK-LOSS packet.
4. The pLINK-LOSS Packet
1. Option Type : 8-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
3. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. A new, unique value generated by the
sending node for different pLINK-LOSS packet.
4. Discriminating Source Address: The address of the sending node of the
pLINK-LOSS packet.
5. Discriminated Target Destination Address: The address of the receiving
destination node which is also marked as selfish by the packet sending node. Other
nodes that picked up this packet will ignore it if the Discriminated Target Desti-
nation Address does not match their own address.
5. The DISTRESS Packet
1. Option Type : 8-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
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Host Source Address
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Destination Address
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data Len
Problematic Node Address
Figure A.5: Packet format for the DISTRESS packet.
3. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. The value for each session is the same
for all the packets.
4. Host Source Address: The address of the node originating the DISTRESS
packet.
5. Destination Address: The address to which the packet is to be delivered to.
This field will be filled with a broadcast value of 255.255.255.255.
6. Problematic Node Address: The address of the node responsible for the link
breakage which is upstream of the node that sent out the DISTRESS packet.
6. The DISTRESS-REPLY Packet
1. Option Type : 6-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Helper Bit (H): 1-bit field. Set to indicate if the node is willing to act as a
HELPER node provided the conditions are fulfilled. A value of 1 indicates the
YES and 0 means NO. If the value is 1, the Helper Path Address fields will be
filled with the relevant values.
3. Selfish Bit (S): 1-bit field. Set to indicate if the ”Problematic Node Address” field
of the DISTRESS packet received matches any of the address under its SELFISH-






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data LenSH
Hop Count to Original Destination
Figure A.6: Packet format for the DISTRESS-REPLY packet.
4. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
5. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. This value is to be copied from the
identification field of the received DISTRESS packet.
6. Host Source Address: The address of the node originating the DISTRESS-
REPLY packet.
7. Target Destination Address: The address of the destination node to which the
packet is to be delivered to. The value should be copied from the Host Source
Address field of the DISTRESS packet.
8. Problematic Node Address: The address of the node responsible for the link
breakage which is upstream of the node that sent out the DISTRESS packet.
9. Current Battery Level : The current remaining battery level of the node that
sent out this packet. This aids in the HELPER node decision making process by
the node that is going to receive the packet.
10. Hop Count to Original Destination : The hop count to the original destination
node from this node. This aids in the HELPER node decision making process by
the node that is going to receive the packet.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data LenR
Figure A.7: Packet format for the RESULTS packet.
1. Option Type : 7-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Result Bit (R): 1-bit unsigned integer. Indicates if a HELPER node has been
found upstream. If yes, a value of 1 would signal to the node receiving this packet
to resend data. If not, a value of 0 would then mean the node has to re-initiate a
new route discovery to the original destination node.
3. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
4. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. A new value is generated for every in-
stance of the packet.
5. Host Source Address: The address of the node originating the NEUTRAL
packet.
6. Target Destination Address: The address of the node to which this packet is
directed to.
7. Rouge Node Address: The address of the node that is responsible for the original
link breakage.
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8. The FORWARDED Packet
Route Source Address
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Route Destination Address
Option Type IdentificationOpt Data Len
Originating Node Address
Figure A.8: Packet format for the FORWARDED packet.
1. Option Type : 8-bit unsigned integer. Nodes that do not understand this option
will ignore the packet.
2. Opt Data Len : 8-bit unsigned integer. It stores the length of the option, in
octets, excluding the Option Type and Opt Data Len fields.
3. Identification : 16-bit unsigned integer. The value for each session is the same
for all the packets.
4. Route Source Address: The initial source address of the route.
5. Route Destination Address: The final destination address of the route.
6. Originating Node Address: The address of the node originating the FOR-
WARDED packet.
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